A critique of the apocalyptic climate narrative

According to the Apocalyptic climate narrative, humanity faces an existential threat from global warming that can be averted only by aggressive suppression of fossil-fuel use. The narrative has been promoted by environmental activists, prominent politicians, and the United Nations for more than three decades and has been accepted as gospel truth by many citizens of the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and other wealthy countries. Alarming narratives that have an aura of plausibility can be highly effective tools for shaping public opinion and public policies. When such narratives are false or seriously misleading, they can do significant damage because of unintended consequences of their policy prescriptions. For example, an alarming narrative—rooted in a false, but plausible-sounding, analogy between the risks of nuclear power plants and nuclear bombs—helped turn public opinion against nuclear power and thereby induced much greater use of coal over the last 50 or so years.1 The substitution of coal for nuclear power shortened millions of lives (due to greater air pollution) and led to higher CO2 emissions than would have otherwise occurred. These unintended consequences of the anti-nuclear-power narrative should make us think carefully before the United States goes too far down the energy path prescribed by the Apocalyptic climate narrative. This paper details the flaws in the Apocalyptic climate narrative, including why the threat from human-caused climate change is not dire and why urgent suppression of fossil-fuel use would be unwise. We argue that sensible public policies would focus instead on developing a diversified portfolio of energy sources to support greater resilience and flexibility to respond to whatever weather and climate extremes might occur. We identify nine principles for sensible US public policies toward energy and discuss implications of the flaws in the narrative for investors and their agents. Hypothesized damaging consequences of global warming include: (i) loss of life from greater intensity and frequency of heat waves, hurricanes, floods, droughts, and wildfires, and (ii) economic losses from such extreme-weather events and from sea-level rise due to melting polar ice caps. Assessments of the impact from human-caused warming are complicated by the difficulty of determining the extent to which observed temperature increases are caused by natural climate variability—a difficulty that adds to the uncertainty in estimates of how much human-caused warming to expect over the 21st century. The question of whether global warming is dangerous (whatever its cause) can be addressed by examining the behavior of the climate since before the time human activity generated large amounts of greenhouse-gas emissions. Human-caused global warming is typically measured with reference to pre-industrial times; for practical reasons in terms of the availability of data, the usual approach employs a baseline period in the late 19th century. Since the late 19th century, Earth's average temperature has increased by about 1.3°C (2.3°F). During the same period, average global sea level has risen 8–9 inches, and there has been little or no detectable change in most types of extreme weather events when measured against the background of natural weather and climate variability. Since the late 19th century, with 1.3°C of global warming, humanity has seen unprecedented increases in prosperity and well-being. Global population has increased from about 1.6 billion in 1900 to 8.2 billion people in 2024. In 1900, the global average lifespan was 34 years; in 2024 the global average lifespan more than doubled to 73 years. From 1961 to 2020, global agricultural output nearly quadrupled, with a 53% increase in per capita output despite a 2.6-fold increase in global population. Since the early 1900s, per capita mortality from hurricanes, floods, droughts, and wildfires has decreased by almost 98%.2 These favorable trends in weather- and climate-related mortality rates reveal that the world is now much better at preventing deaths from extreme weather and climate events than it was a century ago. The sharp reduction in death rates has been accomplished through greater wealth (driven by energy derived from fossil fuels), which provides better infrastructure, superior advance-warning technologies, and greater capacity to recover from weather-related disasters. Although the role of higher temperatures and atmospheric CO2 concentrations in these favorable changes in mortality rates is open to debate, two aspects of the increases are unambiguously beneficial. First, satellite observations since the 1980s indicate widespread greening of the planet. The satellite data show that, over the last two decades, Earth has increased its green leaf area by approximately 5%. This greening reflects increased CO2 fertilization, warmer temperatures, and more rainfall.3 The second aspect relates to heat and cold extremes. An unambiguous consequence of global warming is more frequent heat extremes, coupled with less frequent cold extremes. It is well known that mortality is substantially greater (almost a factor of 10) for extreme cold than for extreme heat.4 Consequently, rising temperatures are associated with a net saving of lives owing to the reduction of mortality from extreme cold events. Heat-related mortality is also declining over time, owing to general improvements in health care systems, increasing prevalence of residential air conditioning, and behavioral changes—factors that have dominated any impact of a warmer planet on the risk of heat-related death.5 Although the dollar value of damages from extreme weather events is now greater than it was many decades ago, this increase is the result of increasing vulnerability and exposure associated with greater population and concentration of wealth in coastal and other disaster-prone regions. A recent analysis summarizing many studies finds no evidence to support claims that any part of the overall increase in global economic losses from weather and climate disasters can be attributed to global warming.6 What about warming over the rest of the 21st century? Is there reason to expect dire consequences for humanity going forward in time? The Apocalyptic climate narrative and the most extreme impacts are driven by extreme emissions scenarios, with 4–5°C of warming by 2100 (above a baseline in the late 19th century). However, since 2021, the UN's climate negotiators have abandoned extreme emissions scenarios as unrealistic for two reasons. First, they make unrealistic assumptions, especially about coal use. Second, actual emissions have been tracking well below their most extreme emission scenario, and indeed slightly below their medium emissions scenario. The UN is now working with an estimated year 2100 warming of 2.5°C,7 while the IEA Roadmap to NetZero projects 2.4°C of warming by 2100.8 When plausible scenarios of natural climate variability and values of climate sensitivity on the lower end of the UN's IPCC likely range are considered, the expected warming could be significantly lower.9 If we work with 2.5°C projected warming by 2100, more than half (1.3°C) of the predicted increase in temperature has already occurred. There are good reasons to expect continued advances in prosperity and well-being over the remainder of the 21st century—and ample reasons such as AI to expect such advances to accelerate. Moreover, the so-called threshold of danger of 2°C warming since pre-industrial times is not an objective threshold of danger. Rather, 2°C is a politically negotiated target designed to motivate broad-based actions to reduce emissions.10 Importantly, there is no credible case that missing the 2°C target would pose an existential risk to humanity. Humans have adapted to (and thrived in) climates extremes far worse than in the pessimistic extreme scenario, as summertime residents of Phoenix and wintertime residents of Minneapolis demonstrate every year. Two other risk-related points are relevant here. First, a basic assumption in the socioeconomic scenarios used in formulating the UN climate-assessment reports is that vulnerability to weather and climate extremes decreases with greater wealth and economic development, as adaptive capacity increases. All of the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) scenarios constructed for the most recent UN climate assessment entail dramatic growth, with global GDP in 2100 between four and ten times larger than in 2010.11 These scenarios do not imply any futures for humanity that are worse than today. Second, risks from human-caused global warming are difficult to separate credibly from natural weather and climate variability and the risks to a large degree reflect the vulnerabilities of less-developed countries and poorer populations generally. Increasing wealth and productivity will continue to reduce humanity's vulnerability to weather- and climate-related risks. Uncertainty about the impact on humans of continued use of fossil fuels is dominated by the difficulties of estimating the likelihood of catastrophic outcomes from climate tipping points that could cause severe and possibly irreversible damage. Climate tipping points are defined as abrupt or nonlinear transitions to a different climate state, which are hypothesized to occur once some threshold has been crossed, with regional or global consequences that are largely uncontrollable and beyond our management. In other words, tipping points are points of no return, at least on the century timescale. In recent geologic history, abrupt climate change has been caused by changes in ocean circulation patterns and ice-sheet dynamics, including (i) the Younger Dryas (12,900–11,700 years ago) when global temperatures dropped by up to 15°C in some regions, (ii) an unnamed sudden cooling event that occurred around 8200 years ago and that lasted about 150 years, and (iii) the Dansgaard-Oeschger Events (115,000–11,500 years ago) with a series of abrupt warmings and cooling during the last Ice Age with temperature shifts of 5–10°C occurring within decades. The IPCC Assessment Reports have considered a number of potential tipping points associated with global warming, including ice-sheet collapse, collapse of the Atlantic Overturning Circulation, carbon release from permafrost thawing, and destruction of the Amazon rainforest and coral reefs. There are some preliminary climate model simulations for some of these conjectured tipping points. However, climate models do not include the appropriate physical, chemical, and biological processes to adequately simulate such events. Hence, these hypothesized climate tipping points have been based largely upon the consideration of imperfect analogues from the geologic past, process models, and physically based storylines. The likelihood of any of the above types of hypothesized tipping points occurring in the 21st century under the medium emissions scenario is generally regarded as low, although there is also low confidence in any conclusions surrounding possible tipping points owing to deep (Knightian) uncertainties in our understanding of the complex climate system. Could something genuinely catastrophic happen to the climate on the timescale of the 21st century? Yes, although continued use of fossil fuels is not the only possible cause. For example, a climate catastrophe could also be caused by nuclear war, a series of natural shifts in ocean circulation shifts in ice-sheet driven by geologic It is to sources of climate-related and it would be to to to low climate with policy actions that would on humanity. There is no that aggressive suppression of fossil-fuel use would significant on humans such time as for fossil fuels for the they in the of and The In terms of risk there is no case for policies that would fossil-fuel use because something might For such suppression to be we should have good reason to think that the low climate catastrophe we would would be far worse than the catastrophe we would by to net We have to credible support for the The Apocalyptic climate narrative CO2 emissions as and dangerous and an economic that a This the that CO2 it is and the that fossil fuels are for and which are of The last 150 years have seen an increase in human that occurred to a large degree because of the use of fossil fuels for and the for and fuels have advances in and air and much have of people to have lives of much higher and generally greater than our of on the of The climate a of global emissions between greenhouse-gas emissions and emission by which as a practical a reduction in fossil-fuel use over the years. countries The United States the under under under and is in the process of under second of fossil carbon from the global energy by is but an in that the atmospheric CO2 concentrations increased from in to in Global emissions from fossil fuels increased from billion in to billion in the world is far from the emissions target and the emissions is from In recent years, the world has amounts on energy in the of fossil-fuel use. In every year since on energy have been or with for 2024 on to These have in slightly the of global energy from fossil but they have so by other sources of and not by fossil-fuel use. the world of its energy from fossil down slightly from in and in In global use of natural and coal have Although a of of has led to less than would otherwise have of is now at a In public and are for increasing emissions and the of policies. has of a than and no would it for a is the greenhouse-gas are also as the cause of global If humans not the with fossil there would be no such by human is the cause of fossil-fuel use and greenhouse-gas emissions. policies are because they do not with this A of economic and have in the of the policies by many of the have induced a greater of and but a range of and have the widespread of these could motivate in fossil fuels by carbon which would in to the emissions they cause. However, to such have been especially in the United States, and have no Although many people they are about global warming, there is widespread the US to for climate-related to a carbon would be especially difficult to once they have a understanding of its climate If the United States its greenhouse-gas emissions to there would be no detectable on Earth's weather or climate over the 21st century. If we the climate model of or 1.3°C warming over the rest of the 21st century, US emissions of about of the would less than of warming over the years. It would be a to US to higher for a reduction in the warming It would be especially to make that when and many other countries are to at These with and carbon have led the US and to to global warming through a of other such as and on and because of their carbon These include through on emissions for the use of the of fossil fuels by on for and and other such to their of fossil-fuel and use of to and other from to support in fossil-fuel in the United States around the These have been because of the to about a potential and because people that these actions will have impact on global to suppression of fossil-fuel use is that it would our by to large amounts of and they will reduce carbon but their to do otherwise are All three countries will be in and economic terms by to their use of fossil The of indicate that we at our the of energy for example, about in of for was to the and of in the and The to their as they for the of the most in the of the was the of the in the in and by the end of the and suppression of fossil-fuel use would be under any as it would on the more than billion people have no to This large of humanity would to and energy to of and to reduce the health risk from exposure to caused by of and There are now more than billion people would to in that most of us in wealthy countries for with and energy that of us would up to any The of is seriously toward the UN's of no no and and the of and to less countries are from to reduce and toward emission in has been more difficult by including on and to the of and that and which fossil fuels for and continued on they are and despite their greenhouse-gas that have the in the toward have which from their For example, widespread of and power has led to increased energy in the United and Germany, to a In a dramatic in and the which led to that was so that the and the The is that many of the for do not or are in the or and is to to be and for For and the are there is to energy at to the that these sources no power and are large in to power to far from points of but also to the of power from and These to are by about the amounts of for and with significant environmental impacts from of for their A is that the for and are with and residents of about of and economic for the about energy are a damaging consequence of the false of that the Apocalyptic climate narrative has about fossil-fuel use. that and fossil However, the low power and of and power an that not be in a The is that and are far to fossil fuels for energy at the at they are of many of the that are for the lives of to people in The result is to from the potential role of more energy that are under and that are expected to better and than and The is not but more energy will as practical and at human amounts of energy can only from the and that we how to which are to fossil-fuel use are in that they would significant on humanity. All of these to against the of for There is from developing many of which are in energy and of citizens would to lives with power that is in wealthy countries. There is a degree of in wealthy have ample to energy and that people in countries should energy and to down global warming when the climate impact of such will almost be to can reduce our vulnerability to weather and climate through air coastal and environmental amounts of will be for humans to be to the from in and other economic that are or There is good reason to a and the continued economic that it far more than to warming from the use of fossil our energy by fossil fuels and a to and will the of Since there is no credible case of an from continued use of fossil we would be in the by their use. Although fossil fuels have a role in for there are good reasons for to reduce our on including environmental and increasing of What for public policies to of more and The of any approach should First, do no the Apocalyptic climate of fossil-fuel use to CO2 emissions in the We should on that by (i) that human and (ii) a range of to fossil fuels as energy sources and as to as with and (iii) the years (and as a period in and and for on an sensible and and environmental impact generally. We should not on US overall economic and public policies to global warming that will not Earth's temperature in the or We should not fossil fuels before we have and for the they in the of and We should use to in in and agricultural as well as in the of humans to to a We should not use to that and while no on temperatures now or in the We should energy reduce air pollution) and energy and economic with a diversified of energy sources to the risks of in the of our and We should on the (and of nuclear which is at least as as and and far than coal and on of death rates due to and air per of We should not focus on and and are because of their (i) and for a power (ii) low energy and to energy at and (iii) from to to the emissions are at least as as while amounts of and a significant role in three in the last years. We should not in of fossil-fuel use by the and the that will the of We should not use our power to policies toward developing countries by the that projects and thereby make it more difficult for people to of The three principles and reflect the that human on the availability of energy and on the role that fossil fuels in the of and which against a focus on and reflects the of these The principles and reflect the that it no to or that will cause humanity to when will have no detectable on global warming in the or These have a from on and on that good from a carbon emissions also have an in terms of from including to greater resilience to weather and climate extremes as well as to of humanity to of The potential and The of is the potential for by to the for green The risk is the that many people will to that the of fossil-fuel use has been far of in public From a the has of a that is by a false narrative. can expect that to or that many people continue to the of an urgent to from fossil fuels and as more to The danger is that the will or as it that the Apocalyptic climate narrative is an effective of that the risks to humanity of continued global might be to that the and for the to in when the or The with such is that in the can a time to Consequently, have to and make against the can be before the are The is that there is no path to a of from green The reason is that be about whether or when the world will to of the flaws in the narrative. The Apocalyptic climate narrative is a seriously for public policy because it the risks to humanity of continued global warming, which are not existential and suppression of fossil-fuel while to the that such suppression would on humans because fossil fuels are for and The to four a for a far more sensible for public policies toward global warming and the use of fossil What would happen the US a emissions In 2100, to Earth's average temperature would be lower it otherwise would by less than which would be temperature US and of with and and of with would because of the role fossil fuels in their A sharp in the of life would Is it Is an reduction in the warming a in the of life caused by an urgent to According to the Apocalyptic climate narrative, the is because humanity faces an existential threat from global However, there is no credible evidence of an existential threat from global is there evidence of that be addressed by humanity's resilience and to to extreme Is an aggressive to emissions politically policies that an urgent to would be especially to to the US once the they would The would almost as more to that, of their global warming is predicted to continue because and many other countries have to continue to use fossil What should the US do about global We should in to and to fossil fuels and in to a We should not fossil-fuel use because that would while no detectable suppression would the before the which is to fossil fuels in the they humans to far and much higher lives than our as as years ago.

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Publication Details

Journal
Journal of applied corporate finance
Published
2025-03-01
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/jacf.12665
Primary Topic
Global Energy and Sustainability Research
Type
article
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article

A critique of the apocalyptic climate narrative

Judith A. Curry, Harry DeAngelo
Journal of applied corporate finance
Global Energy and Sustainability Research
article

A critique of the apocalyptic climate narrative

Judith A. Curry, Harry DeAngelo
article en

Abstract

According to the Apocalyptic climate narrative, humanity faces an existential threat from global warming that can be averted only by aggressive suppression of fossil-fuel use. The narrative has been promoted by environmental activists, prominent politicians, and the United Nations for more than three decades and has been accepted as gospel truth by many citizens of the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and other wealthy countries. Alarming narratives that have an aura of plausibility can be highly effective tools for shaping public opinion and public policies. When such narratives are false or seriously misleading, they can do significant damage because of unintended consequences of their policy prescriptions. For example, an alarming narrative—rooted in a false, but plausible-sounding, analogy between the risks of nuclear power plants and nuclear bombs—helped turn public opinion against nuclear power and thereby induced much greater use of coal over the last 50 or so years.1 The substitution of coal for nuclear power shortened millions of lives (due to greater air pollution) and led to higher CO2 emissions than would have otherwise occurred. These unintended consequences of the anti-nuclear-power narrative should make us think carefully before the United States goes too far down the energy path prescribed by the Apocalyptic climate narrative. This paper details the flaws in the Apocalyptic climate narrative, including why the threat from human-caused climate change is not dire and why urgent suppression of fossil-fuel use would be unwise. We argue that sensible public policies would focus instead on developing a diversified portfolio of energy sources to support greater resilience and flexibility to respond to whatever weather and climate extremes might occur. We identify nine principles for sensible US public policies toward energy and discuss implications of the flaws in the narrative for investors and their agents. Hypothesized damaging consequences of global warming include: (i) loss of life from greater intensity and frequency of heat waves, hurricanes, floods, droughts, and wildfires, and (ii) economic losses from such extreme-weather events and from sea-level rise due to melting polar ice caps. Assessments of the impact from human-caused warming are complicated by the difficulty of determining the extent to which observed temperature increases are caused by natural climate variability—a difficulty that adds to the uncertainty in estimates of how much human-caused warming to expect over the 21st century. The question of whether global warming is dangerous (whatever its cause) can be addressed by examining the behavior of the climate since before the time human activity generated large amounts of greenhouse-gas emissions. Human-caused global warming is typically measured with reference to pre-industrial times; for practical reasons in terms of the availability of data, the usual approach employs a baseline period in the late 19th century. Since the late 19th century, Earth's average temperature has increased by about 1.3°C (2.3°F). During the same period, average global sea level has risen 8–9 inches, and there has been little or no detectable change in most types of extreme weather events when measured against the background of natural weather and climate variability. Since the late 19th century, with 1.3°C of global warming, humanity has seen unprecedented increases in prosperity and well-being. Global population has increased from about 1.6 billion in 1900 to 8.2 billion people in 2024. In 1900, the global average lifespan was 34 years; in 2024 the global average lifespan more than doubled to 73 years. From 1961 to 2020, global agricultural output nearly quadrupled, with a 53% increase in per capita output despite a 2.6-fold increase in global population. Since the early 1900s, per capita mortality from hurricanes, floods, droughts, and wildfires has decreased by almost 98%.2 These favorable trends in weather- and climate-related mortality rates reveal that the world is now much better at preventing deaths from extreme weather and climate events than it was a century ago. The sharp reduction in death rates has been accomplished through greater wealth (driven by energy derived from fossil fuels), which provides better infrastructure, superior advance-warning technologies, and greater capacity to recover from weather-related disasters. Although the role of higher temperatures and atmospheric CO2 concentrations in these favorable changes in mortality rates is open to debate, two aspects of the increases are unambiguously beneficial. First, satellite observations since the 1980s indicate widespread greening of the planet. The satellite data show that, over the last two decades, Earth has increased its green leaf area by approximately 5%. This greening reflects increased CO2 fertilization, warmer temperatures, and more rainfall.3 The second aspect relates to heat and cold extremes. An unambiguous consequence of global warming is more frequent heat extremes, coupled with less frequent cold extremes. It is well known that mortality is substantially greater (almost a factor of 10) for extreme cold than for extreme heat.4 Consequently, rising temperatures are associated with a net saving of lives owing to the reduction of mortality from extreme cold events. Heat-related mortality is also declining over time, owing to general improvements in health care systems, increasing prevalence of residential air conditioning, and behavioral changes—factors that have dominated any impact of a warmer planet on the risk of heat-related death.5 Although the dollar value of damages from extreme weather events is now greater than it was many decades ago, this increase is the result of increasing vulnerability and exposure associated with greater population and concentration of wealth in coastal and other disaster-prone regions. A recent analysis summarizing many studies finds no evidence to support claims that any part of the overall increase in global economic losses from weather and climate disasters can be attributed to global warming.6 What about warming over the rest of the 21st century? Is there reason to expect dire consequences for humanity going forward in time? The Apocalyptic climate narrative and the most extreme impacts are driven by extreme emissions scenarios, with 4–5°C of warming by 2100 (above a baseline in the late 19th century). However, since 2021, the UN's climate negotiators have abandoned extreme emissions scenarios as unrealistic for two reasons. First, they make unrealistic assumptions, especially about coal use. Second, actual emissions have been tracking well below their most extreme emission scenario, and indeed slightly below their medium emissions scenario. The UN is now working with an estimated year 2100 warming of 2.5°C,7 while the IEA Roadmap to NetZero projects 2.4°C of warming by 2100.8 When plausible scenarios of natural climate variability and values of climate sensitivity on the lower end of the UN's IPCC likely range are considered, the expected warming could be significantly lower.9 If we work with 2.5°C projected warming by 2100, more than half (1.3°C) of the predicted increase in temperature has already occurred. There are good reasons to expect continued advances in prosperity and well-being over the remainder of the 21st century—and ample reasons such as AI to expect such advances to accelerate. Moreover, the so-called threshold of danger of 2°C warming since pre-industrial times is not an objective threshold of danger. Rather, 2°C is a politically negotiated target designed to motivate broad-based actions to reduce emissions.10 Importantly, there is no credible case that missing the 2°C target would pose an existential risk to humanity. Humans have adapted to (and thrived in) climates extremes far worse than in the pessimistic extreme scenario, as summertime residents of Phoenix and wintertime residents of Minneapolis demonstrate every year. Two other risk-related points are relevant here. First, a basic assumption in the socioeconomic scenarios used in formulating the UN climate-assessment reports is that vulnerability to weather and climate extremes decreases with greater wealth and economic development, as adaptive capacity increases. All of the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) scenarios constructed for the most recent UN climate assessment entail dramatic growth, with global GDP in 2100 between four and ten times larger than in 2010.11 These scenarios do not imply any futures for humanity that are worse than today. Second, risks from human-caused global warming are difficult to separate credibly from natural weather and climate variability and the risks to a large degree reflect the vulnerabilities of less-developed countries and poorer populations generally. Increasing wealth and productivity will continue to reduce humanity's vulnerability to weather- and climate-related risks. Uncertainty about the impact on humans of continued use of fossil fuels is dominated by the difficulties of estimating the likelihood of catastrophic outcomes from climate tipping points that could cause severe and possibly irreversible damage. Climate tipping points are defined as abrupt or nonlinear transitions to a different climate state, which are hypothesized to occur once some threshold has been crossed, with regional or global consequences that are largely uncontrollable and beyond our management. In other words, tipping points are points of no return, at least on the century timescale. In recent geologic history, abrupt climate change has been caused by changes in ocean circulation patterns and ice-sheet dynamics, including (i) the Younger Dryas (12,900–11,700 years ago) when global temperatures dropped by up to 15°C in some regions, (ii) an unnamed sudden cooling event that occurred around 8200 years ago and that lasted about 150 years, and (iii) the Dansgaard-Oeschger Events (115,000–11,500 years ago) with a series of abrupt warmings and cooling during the last Ice Age with temperature shifts of 5–10°C occurring within decades. The IPCC Assessment Reports have considered a number of potential tipping points associated with global warming, including ice-sheet collapse, collapse of the Atlantic Overturning Circulation, carbon release from permafrost thawing, and destruction of the Amazon rainforest and coral reefs. There are some preliminary climate model simulations for some of these conjectured tipping points. However, climate models do not include the appropriate physical, chemical, and biological processes to adequately simulate such events. Hence, these hypothesized climate tipping points have been based largely upon the consideration of imperfect analogues from the geologic past, process models, and physically based storylines. The likelihood of any of the above types of hypothesized tipping points occurring in the 21st century under the medium emissions scenario is generally regarded as low, although there is also low confidence in any conclusions surrounding possible tipping points owing to deep (Knightian) uncertainties in our understanding of the complex climate system. Could something genuinely catastrophic happen to the climate on the timescale of the 21st century? Yes, although continued use of fossil fuels is not the only possible cause. For example, a climate catastrophe could also be caused by nuclear war, a series of natural shifts in ocean circulation shifts in ice-sheet driven by geologic It is to sources of climate-related and it would be to to to low climate with policy actions that would on humanity. There is no that aggressive suppression of fossil-fuel use would significant on humans such time as for fossil fuels for the they in the of and The In terms of risk there is no case for policies that would fossil-fuel use because something might For such suppression to be we should have good reason to think that the low climate catastrophe we would would be far worse than the catastrophe we would by to net We have to credible support for the The Apocalyptic climate narrative CO2 emissions as and dangerous and an economic that a This the that CO2 it is and the that fossil fuels are for and which are of The last 150 years have seen an increase in human that occurred to a large degree because of the use of fossil fuels for and the for and fuels have advances in and air and much have of people to have lives of much higher and generally greater than our of on the of The climate a of global emissions between greenhouse-gas emissions and emission by which as a practical a reduction in fossil-fuel use over the years. countries The United States the under under under and is in the process of under second of fossil carbon from the global energy by is but an in that the atmospheric CO2 concentrations increased from in to in Global emissions from fossil fuels increased from billion in to billion in the world is far from the emissions target and the emissions is from In recent years, the world has amounts on energy in the of fossil-fuel use. In every year since on energy have been or with for 2024 on to These have in slightly the of global energy from fossil but they have so by other sources of and not by fossil-fuel use. the world of its energy from fossil down slightly from in and in In global use of natural and coal have Although a of of has led to less than would otherwise have of is now at a In public and are for increasing emissions and the of policies. has of a than and no would it for a is the greenhouse-gas are also as the cause of global If humans not the with fossil there would be no such by human is the cause of fossil-fuel use and greenhouse-gas emissions. policies are because they do not with this A of economic and have in the of the policies by many of the have induced a greater of and but a range of and have the widespread of these could motivate in fossil fuels by carbon which would in to the emissions they cause. However, to such have been especially in the United States, and have no Although many people they are about global warming, there is widespread the US to for climate-related to a carbon would be especially difficult to once they have a understanding of its climate If the United States its greenhouse-gas emissions to there would be no detectable on Earth's weather or climate over the 21st century. If we the climate model of or 1.3°C warming over the rest of the 21st century, US emissions of about of the would less than of warming over the years. It would be a to US to higher for a reduction in the warming It would be especially to make that when and many other countries are to at These with and carbon have led the US and to to global warming through a of other such as and on and because of their carbon These include through on emissions for the use of the of fossil fuels by on for and and other such to their of fossil-fuel and use of to and other from to support in fossil-fuel in the United States around the These have been because of the to about a potential and because people that these actions will have impact on global to suppression of fossil-fuel use is that it would our by to large amounts of and they will reduce carbon but their to do otherwise are All three countries will be in and economic terms by to their use of fossil The of indicate that we at our the of energy for example, about in of for was to the and of in the and The to their as they for the of the most in the of the was the of the in the in and by the end of the and suppression of fossil-fuel use would be under any as it would on the more than billion people have no to This large of humanity would to and energy to of and to reduce the health risk from exposure to caused by of and There are now more than billion people would to in that most of us in wealthy countries for with and energy that of us would up to any The of is seriously toward the UN's of no no and and the of and to less countries are from to reduce and toward emission in has been more difficult by including on and to the of and that and which fossil fuels for and continued on they are and despite their greenhouse-gas that have the in the toward have which from their For example, widespread of and power has led to increased energy in the United and Germany, to a In a dramatic in and the which led to that was so that the and the The is that many of the for do not or are in the or and is to to be and for For and the are there is to energy at to the that these sources no power and are large in to power to far from points of but also to the of power from and These to are by about the amounts of for and with significant environmental impacts from of for their A is that the for and are with and residents of about of and economic for the about energy are a damaging consequence of the false of that the Apocalyptic climate narrative has about fossil-fuel use. that and fossil However, the low power and of and power an that not be in a The is that and are far to fossil fuels for energy at the at they are of many of the that are for the lives of to people in The result is to from the potential role of more energy that are under and that are expected to better and than and The is not but more energy will as practical and at human amounts of energy can only from the and that we how to which are to fossil-fuel use are in that they would significant on humanity. All of these to against the of for There is from developing many of which are in energy and of citizens would to lives with power that is in wealthy countries. There is a degree of in wealthy have ample to energy and that people in countries should energy and to down global warming when the climate impact of such will almost be to can reduce our vulnerability to weather and climate through air coastal and environmental amounts of will be for humans to be to the from in and other economic that are or There is good reason to a and the continued economic that it far more than to warming from the use of fossil our energy by fossil fuels and a to and will the of Since there is no credible case of an from continued use of fossil we would be in the by their use. Although fossil fuels have a role in for there are good reasons for to reduce our on including environmental and increasing of What for public policies to of more and The of any approach should First, do no the Apocalyptic climate of fossil-fuel use to CO2 emissions in the We should on that by (i) that human and (ii) a range of to fossil fuels as energy sources and as to as with and (iii) the years (and as a period in and and for on an sensible and and environmental impact generally. We should not on US overall economic and public policies to global warming that will not Earth's temperature in the or We should not fossil fuels before we have and for the they in the of and We should use to in in and agricultural as well as in the of humans to to a We should not use to that and while no on temperatures now or in the We should energy reduce air pollution) and energy and economic with a diversified of energy sources to the risks of in the of our and We should on the (and of nuclear which is at least as as and and far than coal and on of death rates due to and air per of We should not focus on and and are because of their (i) and for a power (ii) low energy and to energy at and (iii) from to to the emissions are at least as as while amounts of and a significant role in three in the last years. We should not in of fossil-fuel use by the and the that will the of We should not use our power to policies toward developing countries by the that projects and thereby make it more difficult for people to of The three principles and reflect the that human on the availability of energy and on the role that fossil fuels in the of and which against a focus on and reflects the of these The principles and reflect the that it no to or that will cause humanity to when will have no detectable on global warming in the or These have a from on and on that good from a carbon emissions also have an in terms of from including to greater resilience to weather and climate extremes as well as to of humanity to of The potential and The of is the potential for by to the for green The risk is the that many people will to that the of fossil-fuel use has been far of in public From a the has of a that is by a false narrative. can expect that to or that many people continue to the of an urgent to from fossil fuels and as more to The danger is that the will or as it that the Apocalyptic climate narrative is an effective of that the risks to humanity of continued global might be to that the and for the to in when the or The with such is that in the can a time to Consequently, have to and make against the can be before the are The is that there is no path to a of from green The reason is that be about whether or when the world will to of the flaws in the narrative. The Apocalyptic climate narrative is a seriously for public policy because it the risks to humanity of continued global warming, which are not existential and suppression of fossil-fuel while to the that such suppression would on humans because fossil fuels are for and The to four a for a far more sensible for public policies toward global warming and the use of fossil What would happen the US a emissions In 2100, to Earth's average temperature would be lower it otherwise would by less than which would be temperature US and of with and and of with would because of the role fossil fuels in their A sharp in the of life would Is it Is an reduction in the warming a in the of life caused by an urgent to According to the Apocalyptic climate narrative, the is because humanity faces an existential threat from global However, there is no credible evidence of an existential threat from global is there evidence of that be addressed by humanity's resilience and to to extreme Is an aggressive to emissions politically policies that an urgent to would be especially to to the US once the they would The would almost as more to that, of their global warming is predicted to continue because and many other countries have to continue to use fossil What should the US do about global We should in to and to fossil fuels and in to a We should not fossil-fuel use because that would while no detectable suppression would the before the which is to fossil fuels in the they humans to far and much higher lives than our as as years ago.

Journal of applied corporate financeVol. 37(2)
University of Southern California (US), Georgia Institute of Technology (US)
Climate action
Openalex Percentile: Top 94%
Global Energy and Sustainability Research
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