Moral Improvement: A Live Option? Wolff’s Perfectionism and Zagzebski’s Moral Exemplarism

Abstract What justifies a comparison is that both Zagzebski’s Moral Exemplarism and Wolff’s Perfectionism have the practical goal of providing guidance for moral improvement. Both accounts threaten to be overdemanding, but for different reasons: Wolff requires distinct cognition for moral improvement, and this cognition is difficult to acquire. Zagzebski requires conscientious reflection for making sure that admiration picks out the “really” admirable. My aim is to show that while Wolff has the resources within his theory to meet this difficulty, Zagzebski does not. In Wolff’s account, the philosopher has an important, mediating role: he can compensate the difficulties. In Zagzebski’s account, however, it is not easy to see how the corruptibility of admiration by sociocultural factors can be compensated. Therefore, the practical purpose of moral improvement threatens to be seriously undermined by the moral relativism implied by admiration.