Differentially Private Bayesian Persuasion

The tension between persuasion and privacy preservation is common in real-world settings. Online platforms should protect the privacy of web users whose data they collect, even as they seek to disclose information about these data (e.g., to advertisers). Similarly, hospitals may share patient data to attract research investments with the obligation to preserve patients' privacy. To address these issues, we study Bayesian persuasion under differential privacy constraints, where the sender must design an optimal signaling scheme for persuasion while guaranteeing the privacy of each agent's private information in the database. To understand how privacy constraints affect information disclosure, we explore two perspectives within Bayesian persuasion: one views the mechanism as releasing a posterior about the private data, while the other views it as sending an action recommendation.

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Publication Details

Published
2025-04-22
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1145/3696410.3714854
Citations
1
Primary Topic
Game Theory and Applications
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
2.11

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article

Differentially Private Bayesian Persuasion

Zhiwei Steven Wu, Shuran Zheng, Yuqi Pan, Haifeng Xu
1 citations
Game Theory and Applications
2.11
article

Differentially Private Bayesian Persuasion

Zhiwei Steven Wu, Shuran Zheng, Yuqi Pan, Haifeng Xu
article en
1 citations

Abstract

The tension between persuasion and privacy preservation is common in real-world settings. Online platforms should protect the privacy of web users whose data they collect, even as they seek to disclose information about these data (e.g., to advertisers). Similarly, hospitals may share patient data to attract research investments with the obligation to preserve patients' privacy. To address these issues, we study Bayesian persuasion under differential privacy constraints, where the sender must design an optimal signaling scheme for persuasion while guaranteeing the privacy of each agent's private information in the database. To understand how privacy constraints affect information disclosure, we explore two perspectives within Bayesian persuasion: one views the mechanism as releasing a posterior about the private data, while the other views it as sending an action recommendation.

Harvard University Press (US), University of Illinois Chicago (US), University of Chicago (US), Carnegie Mellon University (US), Tsinghua University (CN)
National Science Foundation, Army Research Office
Openalex Percentile: Top 14%
Game Theory and Applications
2.11
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Differentially Private Bayesian Persuasion — Zhiwei Steven Wu, Shuran Zheng, et al. · (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS