Differentially Private Bayesian Persuasion
The tension between persuasion and privacy preservation is common in real-world settings. Online platforms should protect the privacy of web users whose data they collect, even as they seek to disclose information about these data (e.g., to advertisers). Similarly, hospitals may share patient data to attract research investments with the obligation to preserve patients' privacy. To address these issues, we study Bayesian persuasion under differential privacy constraints, where the sender must design an optimal signaling scheme for persuasion while guaranteeing the privacy of each agent's private information in the database. To understand how privacy constraints affect information disclosure, we explore two perspectives within Bayesian persuasion: one views the mechanism as releasing a posterior about the private data, while the other views it as sending an action recommendation.
Authors
- Zhiwei Steven Wu (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8125-8227)
- Shuran Zheng (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2575-8283)
- Yuqi Pan (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0002-7603-5886)
- Haifeng Xu (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6371-4906)
Institutions
- Harvard University Press (US)
- University of Illinois Chicago (US)
- University of Chicago (US)
- Carnegie Mellon University (US)
- Tsinghua University (CN)
Publication Details
- Published
- 2025-04-22
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1145/3696410.3714854
- Citations
- 1
- Primary Topic
- Game Theory and Applications
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 2.11
Funders
- National Science Foundation
- Army Research Office