Transition from a fixed fee to a pay-as-you-throw waste tariff scheme: Effectiveness of environmental and accountability appeals

Pay-As-You-Throw (PAYT) tariff schemes, in which households pay based on their waste generation, are proposed as solutions to the growing worldwide challenge of municipal solid waste management. However, public acceptance of such schemes remains low. Using a one-factor between-subject experimental survey design with 620 participants, we test the effects of environmental and accountability appeals and of individual characteristics in shaping preferences for a proposed PAYT scheme in Grenoble, France. We find a positive effect of the accountability appeal and no effect of the environmental appeal on preference for the PAYT scheme compared to a fixed-fee scheme. Additional analyses suggest that accountability appeals are particularly effective for individuals with below-median age, above-median income, and at least a master's degree, indicating that policymakers should target younger and educated citizens with these appeals in PAYT campaigns. Future research could test the applicability of these findings in other settings and for other waste-related interventions.

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Publication Details

Journal
Journal of Environmental Management
Published
2025-05-05
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2025.125603
Primary Topic
Environmental Education and Sustainability
Type
article
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article

Transition from a fixed fee to a pay-as-you-throw waste tariff scheme: Effectiveness of environmental and accountability appeals

Joachim Schleich, Mia M. Birau, Corinne Faure, Lesman Ghazaryan
Journal of Environmental Management
Environmental Education and Sustainability
article

Transition from a fixed fee to a pay-as-you-throw waste tariff scheme: Effectiveness of environmental and accountability appeals

Joachim Schleich, Mia M. Birau, Corinne Faure, Lesman Ghazaryan
article en

Abstract

Pay-As-You-Throw (PAYT) tariff schemes, in which households pay based on their waste generation, are proposed as solutions to the growing worldwide challenge of municipal solid waste management. However, public acceptance of such schemes remains low. Using a one-factor between-subject experimental survey design with 620 participants, we test the effects of environmental and accountability appeals and of individual characteristics in shaping preferences for a proposed PAYT scheme in Grenoble, France. We find a positive effect of the accountability appeal and no effect of the environmental appeal on preference for the PAYT scheme compared to a fixed-fee scheme. Additional analyses suggest that accountability appeals are particularly effective for individuals with below-median age, above-median income, and at least a master's degree, indicating that policymakers should target younger and educated citizens with these appeals in PAYT campaigns. Future research could test the applicability of these findings in other settings and for other waste-related interventions.

Journal of Environmental ManagementVol. 385
Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research (DE), École de management de Lyon (FR), Grenoble Ecole de Management (FR), Université Savoie Mont Blanc (FR)
Openalex Percentile: Top 86%
Environmental Education and Sustainability
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Transition from a fixed fee to a pay-as-you-throw waste tariff scheme: Effectiveness of environmental and accountability appeals — Joachim Schleich, Mia M. Birau, et al. · Journal of Environmental Management (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS