Voluntary Interdependence in Federal Systems: Explaining Deautonomization through Coordinating Conferences in Austria

Abstract Deautonomization—the process of reducing subnational units’ autonomy—is an important concept in federalism studies. This article discusses the difference between coercive and voluntary forms of deautonomization. The featured case is Austria, where informal coordination platforms play a key role in deautonomization despite the presence constitutionally mandated regional organizations whose role in deautonomization is formally exclusive. This article examines the outcomes of tools of voluntary deautonomization in the period since the last failed major reform (the Austrian Convention) between 2005 and 2024. The results show a gradual strengthening of shared rule in every type of state authority except for nonregulatory competence in development projects. In most areas, there has been unification of regulations and policies through the agreements according to Article 15a of the Federal Constitution and specific instruments such as the Austrian Spatial Development Concept.