The Leibnizian foundations of the eighteenth‐century debate on the justification of principles: The problem of the meaning of metaphysics

Abstract The reception of Leibniz encompasses a wide range of authors influenced by his work, such as Wolff, Crusius, and Kant. In this article, I will address the problem of the reception of Leibniz's theory of principles in the context of the debate that arose during the eighteenth century about the meaning and purpose of metaphysics. I will argue that the different positions in the debate can be traced back to a characteristic of Leibnizian philosophy, namely, the functional complexity of principles such as the Principle of Sufficient Reason. This could help to improve the interpretation of (1) the difficulties of the Wolffian approach to the alleged justification of this principle by Leibniz; and (2) the supposed ambiguity concerning Kant's interpretation of Leibniz throughout his works. By pointing out the complexity of Leibniz's approach to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, we can observe the transition (even the proximity) between the Leibnizian and Kantian positions about the principles of human understanding. This could help not only to improve the current interpretation of Leibniz but also to give a clearer picture of the philosophical background against which Kant built his critique of dogmatic metaphysics.