The False Hope of Self-Undermining Arguments against Skepticism: A Case Study

Abstract This paper argues against the prospect of self-undermining arguments against skepticism, more precisely one involving complex reasoning. In a recent paper, Susanna Rinard argues that such skepticism is self-undermining and, by extension, skepticism about the external world as well. Four objections are raised to her conclusion. The first targets a step in her intricate extended argument and the other three provide a more direct defense of skepticism. The second objection consists in distinguishing rationality from justification. The third objection notes that Rinard does not show that there is anything wrong with the skeptical arguments, thus leaving the threat they pose unabated. Lastly, the fourth objection shows that even if Rinard’s argument reveals a self-undermining aspect, that result can instead be developed as support for a Pyrrhonian version of skepticism.