Abortion and Imminent Personhood

Few debates conjure the angst, emotion, and conviction of the debate surrounding abortion and for good reason. The debate brings to the forefront multiple competing goods, including autonomy and respect for life, while affecting individual lives, the law, and politics in complex ways. Within this discussion, one of the preeminent issues is the status of the fetus: Is the fetus an actualized person or merely a potential person? While this question appears to lie at the heart of the conversation, it is based on a misguided view about the nature of the fetus. In this paper, I attempt to clarify the status of the fetus to hopefully re-situate this debate in a more helpful place. I am arguing that a fetus is an imminent person rather than a potential person and that imminent entities have a special moral standing greater than that of potential entities. To make this argument, I first provide background on different views about the metaphysical and moral status of fetuses to provide context for the view that I espouse. Then, I define and argue for the concept of imminence, explaining how it is different from potentiality and grants a greater moral standing to fetuses. Finally, I respond to objections, including arguments concerning whether imminence is a stage of existence, whether the fetus can be both an imminent and a potential person, and whether the personhood of the fetus matters to the debate around abortion.