An Empirical Analysis of an Evolutionary Game Theory Model for Trustworthy Information Collection and Distribution

This paper analyzes the honest-dishonest behavior of cloud data collection and dissemination system users, employing evolutionary game theory. It’s very important to study evolutionary game theory application in cloud data collection and dissemination systems. It tends to describe the trends of honest-dishonest behavior of system stakeholders based on their strategic choices during the game rounds. This study employs involvement and character as criterion to incentivize or reprimand stakeholders. The truthful stakeholder is incentivized while the untruthful stakeholder is penalized. The system is coded using MATLAB software, and several experiments carried out. The system user’s behavior is analyzed using replicator dynamics. The discoveries indicated that regardless of the number of stakeholders selecting an untruthful approach at beginning of the game, the mainstream of stakeholders is encouraged to select a truthful strategy after numerous game rounds. According to a comparative investigation of the evolution dynamics simulation outcomes for information suppliers and users indicated that, ultimately they select honest strategy, and the proportion of honest stabilizes. Consequently, the incentive approach can effectively encourage stakeholders to use the system honestly. The empirically analyzed evolutionary game theory model supports stakeholders' efficient participation and guarantee truthful use of the information collection and dissemination system.