Derrida déconstruit la Phénoménologie

Phenomenology played a significant role in Derrida’s training as a young philosopher. His essay on Husserl’s phenomenological genetic approach, that was published only more than 30 years after it was written, gives us clear proof of this assertion. For the young Derrida, however, there was an inner (and unsolved) dialectic in Husserl’s thought: first, between logicism and psychologism, later, between static and genetic analysis. In his more mature years, Derrida detected the impossibility for Husserl to overcome that dialectic – and offer a satisfactory account of the giveness of logical objectities to a transcendental Ego, and of their grounding in lifeworld experiences – in Husserl’s uncritical belonging to the metaphysics of presence. In this paper, I try to highlight the meaning of this expression and its utility for understanding Husserl’s achievements. I will endorse the thesis that Husserl’s theory of intentionality, static or genetic, cannot be understood in terms of a variety of “foundationalism”, even if of a special kind, as Derrida wants us to believe with his critical analysis especially of Husserl’s late production. This is the ultimate reason why I will question the legitimacy of opposing, like Derrida does, “trace”, on the one hand, and intuitive giveness, on the other, in order to deconstruct Husserl’s alleged uncritical acceptance of the metaphysics of presence.