Enhancing Greenness and Performance of Agricultural Supply Chains with Nash Bargaining Contract Under Consumer Environmental Awareness

To enhance product greenness and operational performance, this study designs a Nash bargaining contract incorporating consumer environmental awareness in an agricultural supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. The manufacturer invests in green technologies and the retailer shares partial green costs to improve greenness and efficiency. Using game theory, theoretical models for competitive scenario without Nash bargaining, local cooperative scenario with given ratio, and global cooperative scenario with Nash bargaining are constructed. Through comparison and sensitivity analysis, the enhancements from Nash bargaining are explored, and the effects of consumer environmental awareness on these enhancements are examined. The findings reveal several key insights. First, the process of bargaining determines the optimal contract ratio, which also depends on the magnitude of price sensitivity, marginal green costs, and consumer environmental awareness. Second, the Nash bargaining contract significantly improves product greenness, increases retail prices, and boosts profits for both the manufacturer and the retailer. Finally, consumer environmental awareness amplifies the effectiveness of the Nash bargaining contract, leading to greener products, higher prices, and greater overall supply chain profits. This research contributes to agricultural supply chain management by providing a theoretically rigorous Nash bargaining mechanism alongside a real-world case study, which harmonizes environmental stewardship and economic viability in agricultural supply chains. The findings offer actionable insights for supply chain managers and policymakers seeking to promote green innovation while maintaining profitability.