Partisan Polarization Mitigates Economic Voting in US Presidential Elections, 1952–2020: Implications for 2024

ABSTRACT Objective Ellis and Ura report that partisan polarization moderates the relationship between economic performance and incumbent party nominees’ two‐party vote share in US presidential elections between 1952 and 2016. We update their model to include the results of the 2020 election and generate forecasts for the 2024 election based on contemporary political‐economic conditions. Methods We re‐estimate Ellis and Ura's polarized times model of incumbent party vote shares in presidential elections, incorporating the results of the 2020 contest between Donald Trump and Joe Biden. The model includes an interaction term between national partisan polarization and economic growth, indicating the extent to which partisan polarization moderates the influence of economic performance on voting in presidential elections. Results Greater partisan polarization attenuates the association between economic performance and voting in presidential elections. Incorporating data from the 2020 election does not appreciably change the polarized times model's point estimates or the substantive implications of the 1952–2016 results Ellis and Ura report. Conclusion Higher partisan polarization weakens the influence of economic performance on presidential election outcomes. In the 2024 presidential election, the political‐economic fundamentals favor the Republican Party nominee, Donald Trump, to a greater extent than they would if lower levels of partisan polarization prevailed.