Sense and React: Self-Destructive Polymorphic Mechanism Against Voltage Tampered Active Physical Attacks

Secrets such as cryptographic keys and obfuscation keys are used in modern computing systems to protect the sensitive and private information as well as intellectual property (IP). During typical operations, they are stored in volatile memories, e.g., registers and SRAMs, which are vulnerable to active physical attacks whereby environmental parameters such as temperature, system clock, and supply voltage, are manipulated to extract information. A common way to protect assets against such attacks are sensors that detect active physical attacks and trigger the destruction of secrets. Often, this requires several thousand clock cycles to accomplish. On top of that, the detection and destruction mechanisms are implemented as separate circuitry, which can be identified and disabled by an attacker. In this article, active physical attacks based on supply voltage manipulation are considered. Storage elements, specifically latches and registers, are designed to change their behavior with supply voltage manipulation and automatically destroy their stored data in an integrated sense and response countermeasure. The ability of an electronic circuit to change its behavior under different environmental conditions is known as polymorphism and such circuits are called polymorphic circuits. In the proposed designs, a genetic algorithm (GA) is used to optimize polymorphic gates designed using two separate approaches, namely, multithreshold null convention logic (MTNCL) and voltage-controlled polymorphism termed in this article as Non-MTNCL. These polymorphic gates are used to design polymorphic latches and registers and both approaches are compared using power, performance, area overhead, reliability criteria, and application in cryptographic benchmarks. It is observed that while the GA-optimized MTNCL-based implementation has 75% less area overhead, the GA-optimized Non-MTNCL implementation is 14% more reliable according to simulation results. Apart from the simulations, proof-of-concept is further provided with an FPGA implementation.

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Publication Details

Journal
IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems
Published
2025-05-01
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1109/tvlsi.2025.3550431
Primary Topic
Smart Grid Security and Resilience
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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article

Sense and React: Self-Destructive Polymorphic Mechanism Against Voltage Tampered Active Physical Attacks

Shahin Tajik, Domenic Forte, Tasnuva Farheen, Luís Mata et al.
4 links
IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems
Smart Grid Security and Resilience
article

Sense and React: Self-Destructive Polymorphic Mechanism Against Voltage Tampered Active Physical Attacks

Shahin Tajik, Domenic Forte, Tasnuva Farheen, Luís Mata, Andrew J. Cannon, Rabin Yu Acharya, Sourav Roy
article en

Abstract

Secrets such as cryptographic keys and obfuscation keys are used in modern computing systems to protect the sensitive and private information as well as intellectual property (IP). During typical operations, they are stored in volatile memories, e.g., registers and SRAMs, which are vulnerable to active physical attacks whereby environmental parameters such as temperature, system clock, and supply voltage, are manipulated to extract information. A common way to protect assets against such attacks are sensors that detect active physical attacks and trigger the destruction of secrets. Often, this requires several thousand clock cycles to accomplish. On top of that, the detection and destruction mechanisms are implemented as separate circuitry, which can be identified and disabled by an attacker. In this article, active physical attacks based on supply voltage manipulation are considered. Storage elements, specifically latches and registers, are designed to change their behavior with supply voltage manipulation and automatically destroy their stored data in an integrated sense and response countermeasure. The ability of an electronic circuit to change its behavior under different environmental conditions is known as polymorphism and such circuits are called polymorphic circuits. In the proposed designs, a genetic algorithm (GA) is used to optimize polymorphic gates designed using two separate approaches, namely, multithreshold null convention logic (MTNCL) and voltage-controlled polymorphism termed in this article as Non-MTNCL. These polymorphic gates are used to design polymorphic latches and registers and both approaches are compared using power, performance, area overhead, reliability criteria, and application in cryptographic benchmarks. It is observed that while the GA-optimized MTNCL-based implementation has 75% less area overhead, the GA-optimized Non-MTNCL implementation is 14% more reliable according to simulation results. Apart from the simulations, proof-of-concept is further provided with an FPGA implementation.

IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) SystemsVol. 33(6)
Worcester Polytechnic Institute (US), Intel (United States) (US), University of Florida (US), Universidad Pontificia Comillas (ES)
National Science Foundation
Openalex Percentile: Top 90%
Smart Grid Security and Resilience
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