Thought Experiments, Fictions, and Irrelevant Details

The article explores the problem of the cognitive value of thought experiments (TEs) and fictions. Specifically, it deals with the claim that fictions have cognitive value in virtue of being (elaborate) thought experiments. First, a short overview of the cognitive value of TEs is presented, followed by the recent findings from experimental philosophy, which cast doubt on the value of TEs. This is followed by an examination and rejection of the claim that fictions are TEs (as presented by Elgin) for two reasons. First, the analogy between scientific and thought experiments and fictions ultimately fails, as fictions contain the very variables that must be absent for performing successful scientific and thought experiments; second, because of this and based on the research in experimental philosophy, fictions should bias the reader to a greater degree than TE— this is shown to be collaborated by text comprehension research. This claim is further substantiated by analysing two examples of fictions, Le Guin’s The Matter of Seggri and her satirical piece A Modest Proposal: Vegempathy. Finally, a more modest claim is considered, namely that fictions contain TEs, which must be properly extrapolated and analysed, yet this leads to issues that are similar to the value of TEs debate. The article thus concludes that using TEs is not advisable for securing the cognitive value of fiction.