The co-loosening of legal knots through petty bribery as an example of symbiotic corruption in Iran

Purpose This paper explores the causes, types and consequences of petty bribery in Iran. Through this exploration, this study aims to shed light on the mechanisms that perpetuate petty bribery, its impact on governance and public trust and potential strategies to affect its prevalence in Iranian society. Design/methodology/approach Semi-structured interviews with bribe givers and bribe takers are used for collecting data. The data analysis was done based on the grounded theory. In this method, there is no pre-existing hypothesis, but it is formed during the analysis. The elements of the theory include categories, their properties and finally, hypotheses. Also, the operations to do are joint collection, coding and data analysis. Findings This study extracts the formality of the state and fake anti-authoritarianism as the causal conditions for petty bribery through creating bureaucratic knots. Facing this phenomenon in the contextual conditions of ignoring reproduction and social proximity, employees and clients adopt one of the four strategies, including autonomous toll collecting, petty quasi-statesman excessive demanding, interpersonal untangling and anti-state retaliating. These can be recognized as four types of petty bribery, the consequences of which are prolonged symbiotic corruption and prevalent anti-solidarism. Originality/value This study contributes original insights by analyzing empirical data to substantiate its arguments, offering a fresh perspective on the dynamics of petty bribery in Iran. The findings reflect the author’s unique interpretation of the data, highlighting the interplay between sociopolitical factors, institutional weaknesses and cultural norms that perpetuate corruption. By uncovering these mechanisms, the research provides a critical foundation for designing targeted social programs aimed at strengthening the rule of law, fostering transparency and combating corruption.