Query-Efficient Algorithm to Find all Nash Equilibria in a Two-Player Zero-Sum Matrix Game

We study the query complexity of finding the set of all Nash equilibria \(\mathcal {X}_\star \unicode{x00D7} \mathcal {Y}_\star\) in two-player zero-sum matrix games. Fearnley and Savani [ 18 ] showed that for any randomized algorithm, there exists an n × n input matrix where it needs to query Ω ( n 2 ) entries in expectation to compute a single Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, Bienstock et al. [ 5 ] showed that there is a special class of matrices for which one can query O(n) entries and compute its set of all Nash equilibria. However, these results do not fully characterize the query complexity of finding the set of all Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum matrix games. In this work, we characterize the query complexity of finding the set of all Nash equilibria \(\mathcal {X}_\star \unicode{x00D7} \mathcal {Y}_\star\) in terms of the number of rows n of the input matrix \(A \in \mathbb {R}^{n \unicode{x00D7} n}\) , row support size \(k_1 := |\bigcup \nolimits _{x \in \mathcal {X}_\star } \text{supp}(x)|\) , and column support size \(k_2 := |\bigcup \nolimits _{y \in \mathcal {Y}_\star } \text{supp}(y)|\) . We design a simple yet non-trivial randomized algorithm that returns the set of all Nash equilibria \(\mathcal {X}_\star \unicode{x00D7} \mathcal {Y}_\star\) by querying at most \(O(nk^5 \cdot \text{polylog}(n))\) entries of the input matrix \(A \in \mathbb {R}^{n \unicode{x00D7} n}\) in expectation, where \(k := \max \lbrace k_1, k_2\rbrace\) . This upper bound is tight up to a factor of poly( k ), as we show that for any randomized algorithm, there exists an n × n input matrix with \(\min \lbrace k_1, k_2\rbrace = 1\) , for which it needs to query Ω ( nk ) entries in expectation in order to find the set of all Nash equilibria \(\mathcal {X}_\star \unicode{x00D7} \mathcal {Y}_\star\) .

Authors

Institutions

Publication Details

Journal
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Published
2025-04-25
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1145/3732787
Primary Topic
Game Theory and Applications
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
article

Query-Efficient Algorithm to Find all Nash Equilibria in a Two-Player Zero-Sum Matrix Game

Lillian J. Ratliff, Ross Boczar, Arnab Maiti, Kevin Jamieson
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Game Theory and Applications
article

Query-Efficient Algorithm to Find all Nash Equilibria in a Two-Player Zero-Sum Matrix Game

Lillian J. Ratliff, Ross Boczar, Arnab Maiti, Kevin Jamieson
article en

Abstract

We study the query complexity of finding the set of all Nash equilibria \(\mathcal {X}_\star \unicode{x00D7} \mathcal {Y}_\star\) in two-player zero-sum matrix games. Fearnley and Savani [ 18 ] showed that for any randomized algorithm, there exists an n × n input matrix where it needs to query Ω ( n 2 ) entries in expectation to compute a single Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, Bienstock et al. [ 5 ] showed that there is a special class of matrices for which one can query O(n) entries and compute its set of all Nash equilibria. However, these results do not fully characterize the query complexity of finding the set of all Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum matrix games. In this work, we characterize the query complexity of finding the set of all Nash equilibria \(\mathcal {X}_\star \unicode{x00D7} \mathcal {Y}_\star\) in terms of the number of rows n of the input matrix \(A \in \mathbb {R}^{n \unicode{x00D7} n}\) , row support size \(k_1 := |\bigcup \nolimits _{x \in \mathcal {X}_\star } \text{supp}(x)|\) , and column support size \(k_2 := |\bigcup \nolimits _{y \in \mathcal {Y}_\star } \text{supp}(y)|\) . We design a simple yet non-trivial randomized algorithm that returns the set of all Nash equilibria \(\mathcal {X}_\star \unicode{x00D7} \mathcal {Y}_\star\) by querying at most \(O(nk^5 \cdot \text{polylog}(n))\) entries of the input matrix \(A \in \mathbb {R}^{n \unicode{x00D7} n}\) in expectation, where \(k := \max \lbrace k_1, k_2\rbrace\) . This upper bound is tight up to a factor of poly( k ), as we show that for any randomized algorithm, there exists an n × n input matrix with \(\min \lbrace k_1, k_2\rbrace = 1\) , for which it needs to query Ω ( nk ) entries in expectation in order to find the set of all Nash equilibria \(\mathcal {X}_\star \unicode{x00D7} \mathcal {Y}_\star\) .

ACM Transactions on Economics and ComputationVol. 13(3)
University of Washington (US), Seattle University (US)
Openalex Percentile: Top 90%
Game Theory and Applications
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.