A Deception Defense Strategy Based on Game Theory

With the development of new technologies such as artificial intelligence, the Internet of Things, and big data, Internet network attack methods have become increasingly complex and diverse, resulting in increasingly serious security issues. To counter these threats, enterprises and individuals need to adopt more advanced and comprehensive network security defense measures. The deception defense strategy effectively achieves proactive network security protection by increasing the difficulty and cost of attacks for attackers. However, the asymmetry of information between the defense and attack parties limits the application of classical game theory. Based on the theory of supergame, this article considers the complexity of network topology and the uncertainty of both defense and attack parties, establishes a multi-round dynamic game model, and formulates a deception defense strategy for network attacks under incomplete information. Simulation results indicate that the proposed deception defense strategy can significantly reduce the false alarm rate by approximately 75% and extend the system's secure failure time.