Carbon removal, mitigation deterrence and the politics of target separation. Evidence from the EU 2040 climate target negotiation

Abstract The ongoing integration of novel carbon dioxide removal (CDR) methods into climate policy has raised concerns that expectations of CDR may delay or undermine emission reduction efforts—a risk discussed as mitigation deterrence. Separating targets for emission reduction and CDR has emerged as a key policy proposal to address this risk, limiting the fungibility of emission reduction and CDR, and enabling critical assessment of the credibility and ambition of mitigation plans. However, stakeholder preferences and rationales as well as factors shaping political decisions on target separation have not been systematically analyzed to date. Here, we investigate the politics of the EU’s 2040 climate target design as a key conflict over how to deal with mitigation deterrence risks in climate policy-making through target separation. Drawing on data from the EU consultation process, document analysis, expert interviews and relevant online events, we find that a majority of stakeholders, including business actors, prefer separate targets over a net target, albeit based on different rationales. We also provide evidence on the political factors that led the European Commission to opt against target separation in its 2040 climate target communication. Our analysis suggests that the Commission perceived separate targets as too complex, inflexible, and potentially costly, particularly in light of a growing backlash to climate policy, concerns over growth and competitiveness, and pressures for legislative simplification and deregulation. Our results contribute to the emerging literature on the political economy of CDR and the empirics of mitigation deterrence and highlight the need to further explore how separate target designs can become politically feasible.