Принципи взаємної інформованості при аналізі функційної та кібербезпеки інформаційно-керуючих систем на програмованих логічних контролерах

The subject of this paper is the properties of instrumental and control systems (ICS) in terms of functional safety (FS) and cybersecurity (CS). This paper investigates the FS and CS of ICS, which are based on digital programmable logic controllers (PLC) and performing the safety related functions. The goal is to develop elements of the methodology for analyzing the design basis by considering the results of the evaluation of the FS of PLC systems (PLC-based ICS) to optimize the costs of such analysis. Objectives: to analyze PLC systems as an object of FS and CS assessment; to formulate and prove the key ideas of the Safety Informed Security (SfISc) concept; to discuss examples and limits of applicability of the formulated statements. The following results are obtained. The principle of the three equivalences is proposed and a generalized structural scheme for its representation is constructed. Two basic theorems are described and proved to establish a relationship between the level of cybersecurity of a PLC, in the presence of information about its functional safety. Based on the first-proven theorems, a basic model of PLC states with a functional safety level of SIL-3 is built in the case of a single hardware failure and/or cyberattack. The existing ontological model SISMECA, which is based on the principle of Security Informed Safety (ScISf), is supplemented. A well-known cyberattack involving a PLC system with high safety level is analyzed. Based on the proposed concept, one of the most likely scenarios of a cyberattack on a PLC in the “online” is evaluated. Conclusions. For the first time, the concept of mutual awareness of the function and cybersecurity of ICS based on PLC - SfISc - is proposed. The theoretical postulates described in this paper make it possible to assess the cybersecurity of a PLC based on previously performed safety assessments. The SfISc principle can be used in the following practical cases: in the process of licensing a new or modernized functional safety ICS; in determining the level of compliance of existing systems that are important for safety with new cybersecurity requirements; and in developing the requirements for a safety-related ICS.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
Aerospace technic and technology
Published
2025-03-21
DOI
https://doi.org/10.32620/aktt.2025.2.10
Primary Topic
Smart Grid Security and Resilience
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Принципи взаємної інформованості при аналізі функційної та кібербезпеки інформаційно-керуючих систем на програмованих логічних контролерах

Vyacheslav Kharchenko, Oleksandr Ivasiuk
Aerospace technic and technology
Smart Grid Security and Resilience
article

Принципи взаємної інформованості при аналізі функційної та кібербезпеки інформаційно-керуючих систем на програмованих логічних контролерах

Vyacheslav Kharchenko, Oleksandr Ivasiuk
article en

Abstract

The subject of this paper is the properties of instrumental and control systems (ICS) in terms of functional safety (FS) and cybersecurity (CS). This paper investigates the FS and CS of ICS, which are based on digital programmable logic controllers (PLC) and performing the safety related functions. The goal is to develop elements of the methodology for analyzing the design basis by considering the results of the evaluation of the FS of PLC systems (PLC-based ICS) to optimize the costs of such analysis. Objectives: to analyze PLC systems as an object of FS and CS assessment; to formulate and prove the key ideas of the Safety Informed Security (SfISc) concept; to discuss examples and limits of applicability of the formulated statements. The following results are obtained. The principle of the three equivalences is proposed and a generalized structural scheme for its representation is constructed. Two basic theorems are described and proved to establish a relationship between the level of cybersecurity of a PLC, in the presence of information about its functional safety. Based on the first-proven theorems, a basic model of PLC states with a functional safety level of SIL-3 is built in the case of a single hardware failure and/or cyberattack. The existing ontological model SISMECA, which is based on the principle of Security Informed Safety (ScISf), is supplemented. A well-known cyberattack involving a PLC system with high safety level is analyzed. Based on the proposed concept, one of the most likely scenarios of a cyberattack on a PLC in the “online” is evaluated. Conclusions. For the first time, the concept of mutual awareness of the function and cybersecurity of ICS based on PLC - SfISc - is proposed. The theoretical postulates described in this paper make it possible to assess the cybersecurity of a PLC based on previously performed safety assessments. The SfISc principle can be used in the following practical cases: in the process of licensing a new or modernized functional safety ICS; in determining the level of compliance of existing systems that are important for safety with new cybersecurity requirements; and in developing the requirements for a safety-related ICS.

Aerospace technic and technology(2)
Openalex Percentile: Top 91%
Smart Grid Security and Resilience
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