Are Auditor Reputations Affected by Private Communication Channels?

ABSTRACT Prior research finds that audit offices lose market share after they are involved in alleged audit failures. We examine whether such reputation effects are driven by private communications from rival auditors. We determine which offices are likely to be well informed about alleged audit failures by identifying the incoming office of the client accused of misreporting and by identifying law firm connections between each audit firm and the plaintiffs and defendants in each lawsuit. Consistent with private communications being a driver of auditor reputation effects, we find that tainted offices lose significantly more market share to rival offices that are likely to be informed about the alleged audit failure. JEL Classifications: M42.

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Publication Details

Journal
The Accounting Review
Published
2025-04-24
DOI
https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2023-0447
Citations
2
Primary Topic
Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
7.82
Controls
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article

Are Auditor Reputations Affected by Private Communication Channels?

Clive S. Lennox, Bing Li, Jinxing Qu
2 citations
The Accounting Review
Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance
7.82
article

Are Auditor Reputations Affected by Private Communication Channels?

Clive S. Lennox, Bing Li, Jinxing Qu
article en
2 citations

Abstract

ABSTRACT Prior research finds that audit offices lose market share after they are involved in alleged audit failures. We examine whether such reputation effects are driven by private communications from rival auditors. We determine which offices are likely to be well informed about alleged audit failures by identifying the incoming office of the client accused of misreporting and by identifying law firm connections between each audit firm and the plaintiffs and defendants in each lawsuit. Consistent with private communications being a driver of auditor reputation effects, we find that tainted offices lose significantly more market share to rival offices that are likely to be informed about the alleged audit failure. JEL Classifications: M42.

The Accounting ReviewVol. 100(4)
University of Southern California (US), City University of Hong Kong (HK), Shanghai University of Finance and Economics (CN), California Southern University (US)
Peace, Justice and strong institutions
Openalex Percentile: Top 4%
Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance
7.82
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