A Hundred Thousand Darlingtons: Self‐Respect, Moral Judgement, and the Right to an Equal Democratic Say

ABSTRACT I defend the non‐instrumentalist thesis that every adult member of a political society has a pro tanto fundamental moral right to an equal democratic say in determining the content of the laws to which she is subject. I begin by giving an account of an important kind of servility that has received only glancing notice in philosophical discussion. This servility consists in the willingness to subordinate one's capacity for moral judgement (as distinct from one's interests, desires, or will) to another's. I argue that, barring special circumstances, an adult person who willingly acquiesces to a lesser political liberty displays this type of servility. An adult cannot normally self‐respectfully acquiesce to a less than equal democratic say. But, I argue, a condition for a political society to be just is that its members can self‐respectfully acquiesce to the status it accords them. Thus, it is a pro tanto intrinsic requirement of justice that all adult members of a political society be granted an equal democratic say. There is a pro tanto fundamental moral right to an equal democratic say.

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Publication Details

Journal
Analytic Philosophy
Published
2025-04-24
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12372
Citations
1
Primary Topic
Political Philosophy and Ethics
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
8.52

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article

A Hundred Thousand Darlingtons: Self‐Respect, Moral Judgement, and the Right to an Equal Democratic Say

Shruta Swarup
1 citations
Analytic Philosophy
Political Philosophy and Ethics
8.52
article

A Hundred Thousand Darlingtons: Self‐Respect, Moral Judgement, and the Right to an Equal Democratic Say

Shruta Swarup
article en
1 citations

Abstract

ABSTRACT I defend the non‐instrumentalist thesis that every adult member of a political society has a pro tanto fundamental moral right to an equal democratic say in determining the content of the laws to which she is subject. I begin by giving an account of an important kind of servility that has received only glancing notice in philosophical discussion. This servility consists in the willingness to subordinate one's capacity for moral judgement (as distinct from one's interests, desires, or will) to another's. I argue that, barring special circumstances, an adult person who willingly acquiesces to a lesser political liberty displays this type of servility. An adult cannot normally self‐respectfully acquiesce to a less than equal democratic say. But, I argue, a condition for a political society to be just is that its members can self‐respectfully acquiesce to the status it accords them. Thus, it is a pro tanto intrinsic requirement of justice that all adult members of a political society be granted an equal democratic say. There is a pro tanto fundamental moral right to an equal democratic say.

Analytic Philosophy
University of Toronto (CA)
University of Toronto
Openalex Percentile: Top 5%
Political Philosophy and Ethics
8.52
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