Distributed secondary control of DC microgrids with event-triggered quantization communication under DoS attacks

Abstract A resilient distributed secondary control strategy is proposed for DC microgrids (MGs) with denial-of-service (DoS) attacks on communication channels to achieve accurate current sharing and voltage regulation. According to the designed resilient control strategy, when there is no DoS attacks, the quantization information is sent to neighboring distributed generators (DGs) only when the triggering condition is satisfied. When there is a DoS attack, the communication can not be carried out normally. Then, each DG would attempt to send messages to its neighbors at a preset period until the attack disappears. The maximum allowable communication attempt period is determined by theoretical analysis, which is one of sufficient conditions to ensure current sharing and voltage regulation. As a result, the control signals are updated by discrete-time quantized information, which greatly reduces the communication burden, and effectively defends against DoS attacks. The asymptotic stability of the system is analyzed to show the results that voltage regulation and accurate current sharing are achieved. The proposed control strategy is verified through simulations.