Mark Stille, The Battle of Leyte Gulf: A New History of the World’s Largest Sea Battle

Reviews 465 securing the destruction of the British Eastern Fleet, which was largely due to weaknesses in Japanese aircraft search techniques combined with bad luck allowing the Royal Navy to escape as lightly as they did.It was a near run thing.Stille is even-handed in his analysis of this episode, pointing out weaknesses in ships and their designs or capabilities, operational techniques, and leadership on both sides.Some of his judgements are perhaps overly harsh, such as his description of Vice Admiral Nagumo's handling of his carrier force as "incompetent" for example.This does not allow for the fact that there had been little opportunity to gain war experience in this, the fourth month of a carrier-oriented maritime war.Indeed, some of Vice Admiral Somerville's mistakes were similar in nature.Stille does, however, make an astute observation regarding Somerville's reckless actions in seeking to attack Nagumo's carrier force, following the RN doctrine of "offensive action" under virtually all circumstances.Somerville's decision in this regard can perhaps be blamed on criticism from Admiralty to Somerville when he was commanding Force H in the Mediterranean for a lack of "offensive spirit" against an Italian force.While it is certain that offensive action is desirable, there is a role for judgement.Throwing one's ships away in an entirely unequal contest is rarely justified.Surviving to husband resources and permitting their growth, reverting in due course to an aggressive posture, is strategically sensible.It is a fine distinction to be sure.This is not an academic book and is not footnoted.It is a short account of the IJN's 1942 Indian Ocean incursion that, in common with all Osprey Book's productions, is lavishly illustrated with photos, paintings, and diagrams.The production quality is very high.A brief bibliography is provided that includes both older sources and more current ones, as well as a select number of primary sources (generally official accounts both British and Japanese).Overall, it provides an excellent introduction to the subject and will give all readers a succinct overview of the entire episode from the perspectives of both sides.I can recommend the book on that basis.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
The Northern Mariner / Le marin du nord
Published
2025-04-22
DOI
https://doi.org/10.25071/2561-5467.1308
Primary Topic
Maritime Security and History
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Mark Stille, The Battle of Leyte Gulf: A New History of the World’s Largest Sea Battle

Petar Djokovic
The Northern Mariner / Le marin du nord
Maritime Security and History
article

Mark Stille, The Battle of Leyte Gulf: A New History of the World’s Largest Sea Battle

Petar Djokovic
article en

Abstract

Reviews 465 securing the destruction of the British Eastern Fleet, which was largely due to weaknesses in Japanese aircraft search techniques combined with bad luck allowing the Royal Navy to escape as lightly as they did.It was a near run thing.Stille is even-handed in his analysis of this episode, pointing out weaknesses in ships and their designs or capabilities, operational techniques, and leadership on both sides.Some of his judgements are perhaps overly harsh, such as his description of Vice Admiral Nagumo's handling of his carrier force as "incompetent" for example.This does not allow for the fact that there had been little opportunity to gain war experience in this, the fourth month of a carrier-oriented maritime war.Indeed, some of Vice Admiral Somerville's mistakes were similar in nature.Stille does, however, make an astute observation regarding Somerville's reckless actions in seeking to attack Nagumo's carrier force, following the RN doctrine of "offensive action" under virtually all circumstances.Somerville's decision in this regard can perhaps be blamed on criticism from Admiralty to Somerville when he was commanding Force H in the Mediterranean for a lack of "offensive spirit" against an Italian force.While it is certain that offensive action is desirable, there is a role for judgement.Throwing one's ships away in an entirely unequal contest is rarely justified.Surviving to husband resources and permitting their growth, reverting in due course to an aggressive posture, is strategically sensible.It is a fine distinction to be sure.This is not an academic book and is not footnoted.It is a short account of the IJN's 1942 Indian Ocean incursion that, in common with all Osprey Book's productions, is lavishly illustrated with photos, paintings, and diagrams.The production quality is very high.A brief bibliography is provided that includes both older sources and more current ones, as well as a select number of primary sources (generally official accounts both British and Japanese).Overall, it provides an excellent introduction to the subject and will give all readers a succinct overview of the entire episode from the perspectives of both sides.I can recommend the book on that basis.

The Northern Mariner / Le marin du nordVol. 34(3)
Life below water
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Maritime Security and History
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Mark Stille, The Battle of Leyte Gulf: A New History of the World’s Largest Sea Battle — Petar Djokovic · The Northern Mariner / Le marin du nord (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS