<scp>PCAOB</scp> international inspections and <scp>US</scp> companies' exports

Abstract We examine the implications of the PCAOB international inspection program for US companies' exports. Our difference‐in‐differences analyses suggest that, following the release of the initial PCAOB inspection report in a country abroad, (1) US companies' exports to that country increased, and (2) US companies' major customers in that country reported higher accounts payable. Probing further, the effect on US exports is stronger for companies requiring more relationship‐specific investments and for foreign countries with less transparency, weak auditor oversight, and low social trust. Our findings suggest that the release of the initial PCAOB inspection report in a country abroad serves as a public signal of oversight that increases trust in financial reporting integrity abroad, thereby facilitating growth in trade credit and an increase in US exports to companies in that country. Our findings suggest that stakeholders other than investors benefit from PCAOB international inspection reports and highlight a novel externality of the PCAOB international inspection regime benefiting US companies.