Insider–outsider representation and the logic of membership and participation. A multi-level analysis of unions' positions and individual attitudes on welfare state reforms

Abstract The insider–outsider theses suggest that trade unions have usually had strong incentives to represent the interests of the insiders. However, we argue that unions’ position on welfare state reforms will be affected by insiders and outsiders, depending on their level of membership and activity within the union. We combine macro-level data (content analysis of press releases) on six different unions in Germany with individual-level data (German Internet Panel), including information regarding differently skilled insider and outsider. We use a mix-method approach, and the results show that the attitudes of the low-skilled insiders (blue-collar workers) and low-skilled outsiders (low service functionaries) play a significant role in shaping unions’ positions. Both groups exhibit a high level of union membership and activity within unions. We conclude that this represents an important mechanism for understanding the influence of insiders and outsiders on unions’ position towards welfare state reforms.