Freedom as hesitation: Henri Bergson in the light of phenomenological criticism

Abstract Bergson’s conception of freedom coincides in certain respects with phenomenological approaches, especially in its emphasis on the inherently temporal character of freedom. Nevertheless, it has repeatedly been subject to criticism in phenomenology. In the first part of the study, the author lists three points of the phenomenological critique of Bergson: a different conception of consciousness, a different confidence in the possibilities of metaphysics, and a different way of working with descriptive distinctions, with Bergson moving quickly from descriptive distinctions to conceptual opposites. Despite these differences, however, Bergson and some phenomenological authors share the conviction that freedom is necessarily temporal, that decision and action are processes that cannot be accelerated or skipped, implying hesitation as an indispensable ingredient. The second part of the study is devoted to the analysis of hesitation in phenomenology (as conceived by Paul Ricœur) and in Bergson. Through a phenomenological reading of Bergson, it offers a conception of hesitation as creativity that can also enrich phenomenology. The article pays particular attention to the very relevance of hesitation. Is the reason for hesitation cognitive (lack of information), volitional (lack of determination of the will) or other? The author proposes an option that preserves both elements but opens up a different perspective: the reason for the hesitation is that it contains elements of interpretation.