Human Rights Against Climate Risks and the Problem of Paralysis

Climate change is widely considered the most serious threat humanity has ever faced. The World Health Organization estimates that around 3.6 billion people already live in areas susceptible to climate change and estimates 250,000 deaths per year to occur due to climate change from 2030 to 2050 if nothing is done (World Health Organisation 2023). Climate change kills here and now, and it will continue to kill for the foreseeable future. This outcome could have been mitigated since the excessive acceleration in climate change is primarily due to human action: By emitting greenhouse gases, humanity created and continues to create a disastrous global warming effect. Many of us share the intuition that there is something wrong about contributing to climate change by emitting greenhouse gases.1 Various ethical theories attempt to explain why precisely contributing to climate change is wrong: Consequentialist theories state that contributing to climate change is wrong because it does not bring about the best consequences (Jamieson 2013; Morgan-Knapp and Goodman 2015). Virtue ethical theories state that contributing to climate change is wrong because it is expressive of a vicious character (Cafaro and Sandler 2005). Contractualist theories state that contributing to climate change is wrong insofar as it is prohibited by a principle no one could reasonably reject (Suikkanen 2014). Lastly, rights-based theories state that contributing to climate change is wrong because it violates the rights of others. My primary focus here is on a specific version of rights-based theories, which claims that contributing to climate change is wrong because it violates other persons' human rights. In this article, I discuss a particularly popular version of a rights-based approach to climate ethics, Simon Caney's human rights approach (Caney 2009a, 2009b, 2010a, 2010b, 2012, 2022). According to Caney, it is wrong for persons (as well as states, corporations etc.) to contribute to anthropogenic climate change because doing so violates others' human rights (Caney 2010a). To this day, Caney's account remains one of the most influential and most sophisticated rights-based approaches to climate ethics. In what follows, I argue that while Caney's approach seems appealing at first glance, it fails to appreciate severe theoretical problems rights-based theories face in cases involving risk. In particular, I argue that Caney's human rights approach to climate ethics is subject to the so-called “Problem of Paralysis” (PoP), which is a well-known problem for risk-sensitive rights-based approaches. The PoP in its general version states that because almost all human conduct entails some risk of harm to others, a right prohibiting risk impositions generally would be paralyzing (Wolff and Hayenhjelm 2012; Holm 2016). I argue that meeting the challenge from the PoP is extremely difficult and even if it can be met, non-consequentialists have good reason to favor other approaches to climate ethics. Even though I focus on Caney's human rights approach in this article, the PoP arguably also extends to similarly structured rights-based accounts such as those presented by Gardiner (2013); Bell (2011), and Vanderheiden (2008). Due to space constraints, I am unable to discuss these accounts in detail. But if my conclusion is correct, it provides us with a strong reason to look for alternatives to rights-based approaches to climate ethics. The article is structured as follows: In a first section, I characterize Caney's human rights approach to climate risks. I illustrate why the approach must ultimately insist that climate risk impositions qua contributions to climate change are impermissible. The second section introduces the PoP. I clarify why the PoP spells trouble for Caney and illustrate how the distinction between luxury and subsistence emissions could potentially solve the The illustrate problems with this The section that the on a right to The section states that the distinction between luxury and subsistence emissions is and that it does not account for The section is to with the PoP which problems of its In a section, I argue that those with approaches to climate ethics favor a approach to climate ethics, which I in the are of as on the of the a is to is to of to my it to rights as a of of the a in the rights are rights that some of conduct from of the human in the that is for is a of it is a right that human has in of it is a in the that it is of its other human rights generally other claims even if this is not (Caney 2010a, Caney's climate ethics account is around this of human rights. In particular, that anthropogenic climate change human the human right to the human right to and the human right to (Caney 2010a, that have a right not to from climate change which these (Caney Caney of these rights as human rights of that are of to on not to in conduct which (Caney that a in and a from that this which the of human right to and it also the human right to to human rights will this as and for the of the not to in such (Caney 2010a, This is since it that Caney that human rights to others' right to and is by the of the the has not to in such The has this even though for it is not will ultimately be by the the Caney to the that which has a of others' human rights is This of to the of greenhouse conduct the of climate change which in in and which have human rights and are extremely to continue to so in the on Climate us which are by climate change and to human rights climate risks. the of greenhouse and climate on others. According to Caney, from the emitting greenhouse is not that on with the it (Caney 2009b, Caney is about the that does not a general account of risk ethics (Caney 2009b, account as a which entails that is for the per to to the with climate (Caney 2009b, In Caney's human rights account states that of us has human rights which on not to in conduct which climate which in and Caney ultimately provides a rights-based account of climate risk In what follows, I argue that the account is subject to a problem with rights-based accounts in risk the PoP. The ethics of risk risk is a in ethics. the of risk ethics is to which risk impositions are and which are In the on risk ethics, the the of a The is the of the with which the outcome will and the My focus here with rights-based theories of risk ethics. theories of risk state that risk impositions are insofar as others' right not to have and Hayenhjelm argue that rights-based approaches to risk ethics face a serious which to as the PoP. The PoP from the that almost all human conduct on I there is a risk that my will and a I my to I a I with my from my and my in the even there is a risk that in have good reason to insist that if with with a violates it is also wrong to a risk of doing so others. But because that others, the PoP that right risk would all human would and one of us if not to others' rights risk first glance, the PoP a theoretical problem for rights-based theories such as there must be some to rights risk in a which us to well as and Hayenhjelm the PoP is of rights-based approaches to risk ethics. with some of the contributions to risk ethics due to and it remains for rights-based approaches to risk ethics as Holm a general to the PoP has to be the in the on risk ethics and the that risk is a in climate ethics, it is that Caney the PoP one can how the PoP could Caney's human rights The is on Many of the and on emissions as a of these to In of are to and to and and so Even the to all emissions in to climate others, would as the PoP The PoP rights-based approaches such as Caney's to clarify which risk impositions rights and which Caney provides a The distinction between subsistence and luxury Caney that if a a not and in such a that to severe a for emitting the greenhouse to a (Caney 2009b, To the best of my what this to is by Caney at the that it a of which the in with will to and a of (Caney 2009b, Caney 2010a, Caney 2010b, I Caney in from and to emissions to this of as and emissions that as I so because Caney states that the that persons are to subsistence (Caney 2009b, Caney that climate that as a of subsistence emissions are and not others' while climate by luxury emissions are this is the is insofar as has a right to subsistence of in climate are with this from subsistence the right to subsistence that the that subsistence emissions are is the distinction between luxury and subsistence emissions is are to subsistence emissions because have a right to this entails that are to climate as these from the of subsistence Many climate that subsistence emissions on be to a of climate change and the of climate of and Gardiner This from the that the of greenhouse in the is already so that subsistence emissions will the risk of even severe climate change 2023). that of rights the of these rights others' rights I have a right to I not have a right to in the in of my I have a right to I not have a right to so that with and so climate others' rights (as Caney it seems that the right to subsistence would it to climate others. to this of is that subsistence emissions as a of 2014). to emissions to are to in a with a of and so that can and by some of harm on Even if the of it is to some of harm The is that even if subsistence emissions some harm to it is to in to and a general if is to as the of is are in others, insofar as are a threat to To with it be of to of the even if on others' on But it is not of to of the as a for a which us so would be to the of the as a for to climate from subsistence emissions would that are to at some all not a threat to as a for subsistence by climate the right to subsistence us to as in this it is In Caney could argue that the of account is there is a that of can from climate to that (Caney 2010b, Caney's account cases in which subsistence emissions is to climate risks. also the because the not to climate on does not the to subsistence emissions and In Caney could account to cases in which there is no between the right to subsistence and the right of to climate are that I would to with to this as I in the of this section, there is a climate ethics that even a global of emissions to subsistence will not to climate risk In all a severe of the climate will even if of emissions to subsistence is that the can climate on others, even if emissions to subsistence this is correct, Caney's account in the would that the account in even if there are cases in which it is that the can climate by emissions to subsistence this does not that this outcome is climate will a of right to subsistence due to anthropogenic climate In to these of would have to emissions subsistence it is that of climate can be by emissions to subsistence the between the right to subsistence emissions and the right of not to be to climate The does not this and also fails to the PoP in the at in some In the section, I will discuss in which Caney attempt to the between the right to subsistence and a right climate risks. In it is that the right to subsistence is strong to climate those not to as a is not since version of would not us to to Caney's account such that it to cases in which it is that a severe in emissions climate risk impositions the account since it that no such cases even if these cases Caney's account to these cases would also not the PoP as by the between of rights to subsistence emissions and others' rights not to be to climate risks. In the of Caney's of the right to subsistence as strong not in all Even if some version of the right to subsistence which climate can ultimately be there are to that there is no reasonably distinction between subsistence and luxury that some emissions will are cases in which to about in some not be are in a of conduct that is for a of and one to and luxury subsistence such will a and us that can this even if that some climate conduct is to a of not have emissions to This is to occur if with Caney that the for subsistence emissions is at the of emissions to a of us to emissions that are in the of subsistence as emissions are by not subsistence emissions and are to because others' right not to be to climate from will in be difficult since are human and for be of of doing in to be with is to that due to and emissions will to as and emissions will be to a of the global on have good reason to about to emissions in the The here is if prohibited from would in also be prohibited from us to a version of in which are prohibited from subsistence in to climate on others. for rights to with this problem is to rights in a that to be in by the of people from on that doing so violates others' rights. But also that it is to insofar as one does so even there is a that be by and to as as would Even if this attempt to the of is Caney could similarly insist that even if the distinction between subsistence and luxury emissions is in the that are to some a general of luxury emissions remains insofar as in the of emissions are a the are not in if a of emissions in the of not be others' human rights. In particular, Caney to argue that even if emissions not as subsistence to be because are of that a of rights between the rights to subsistence also emissions and others' rights not to be to climate from emissions as Caney on how such between rights to be that which right ultimately on the (Caney 2009b, This is a which for the that if emissions in climate it be to to even on emissions to a of But this entails that if the at in some such is in favor of rights that not to climate from emissions others, the is not a general of emissions in all In some it must be the that people are prohibited from subsistence even on Caney's This a version of since there will be some cases in which the will that some people must that are in of Even if Caney that this is there is a emissions be In what follows, I discuss and argue that are emissions that have been and emissions that are to be considered The first is a because it will also the of luxury luxury emissions are it is that are as a of some other to a in for the of luxury emissions as arguably no luxury emissions are impermissible. emissions as the to luxury is wrong to to on the that the of is one it is be for risk. no to the if the is one (Caney 2009b, it for Caney to climate risk those from on with a human rights since doing so the that climate risk impositions can human rights the that are the on for also entails that there can be no which climate does not a of others' human there is no I rights of I a risk of one in a billion that will severe due to my emissions I a in risk of a outcome on climate risk that is not the of subsistence emissions as a human rights of its are could if as a of of can to the in to the the the it will and risk of severe all of the the it all the to a risk of severe at one as of is to this all the in the By of the rights if the the because the those the it is also that at if all the the this will in all at one right to have reason to from in because it will with also have reason to from the in the on insofar as the of persons rights will be does not per on Caney's not be for the to in the first The general is that if have reason to risk impositions the because are to human have similarly good reason to risk impositions the if the is such that rights are to be The is that there is no in which a of risk could be of for have reason to luxury emissions because climate similarly have reason to emissions the because will to a of climate change which is to in human rights at some in are Caney could that even emissions also be considered insofar as to This is The to with some of these are even if to while are even if not to The from which these are to be is not Holm one could argue that even though emissions a of the not such a there is no reason to emissions as even if rights. In the climate ethics the that emissions have no on climate change is to as the of the of and the problem of can be not remains in the In the problem of is for the from is correct, not even luxury emissions are a to the of the which will almost be the as Caney to that not to luxury emissions also not that emissions are To the distinction between subsistence and luxury emissions is because of I that the problem here is that Caney to explain how to with in the of such problems in some it be to people from subsistence emissions in to from climate risks. this is correct, the right to subsistence is even if the right to subsistence is in at some it remains how to which emissions are to in In the section, I a from that can the PoP by insofar as is that there is humanity does not its emissions to a of greenhouse in the and that there is that the people from doing that which are to In such a is (Caney 2012, could also a for the there is no to to subsistence can for human rights Even though the there is a be it is to be the that emissions and those In Caney's a principle of which generally on others' rights even one can doing so the of a right to to it one has the of not doing (Caney 2009b, it is to and if it to in the first This that of emissions a and I it here those are to have a to for subsistence I focus on Even with the from a of problems that is to rights have been by the the rights. Caney that also in the of climate change that human rights have been those have been are to (Caney 2010a, the by which climate change are as This that not and rights ultimately have will In all will to persons not by emissions and to those have at in the of climate is of a which be in to a specific rights which a and must be But if is to as a for with emissions which others' human Caney precisely to the of rights and in of this specific even if a of can be some problems with To for risk impositions are difficult to in of and the risk and the would to This problem is particularly if that will be by the climate that Caney would to argue that at in some not climate risk from climate risk impositions to be would have to explain how to with the problem of harm from climate risk impositions which can in principle not be could the of be at Caney as a serious problem for (Caney 2009b, some to can be if the have a have the right to the and can so and to to risk. for the risk if can share in the of the if are if the This not to us that some of the have to be and some are (Caney 2009b, Caney that to a can be from By and for good the from seems to if it from To the from is at the problem of I that there are problems with the the a of there are problems to be and will some of in to the of a the of can be from is Caney can with such as the of a and and why a in the of a is to the from to to from In the to even for emissions Caney's account to a of serious I have that the PoP a severe problem for Caney's human rights-based The distinction between subsistence and luxury emissions fails as a to the PoP for Even if Caney can ultimately a to with the I to have that this will in all be and the which Caney's account appealing in the first I that those with have good reason to look for approaches that can with risk impositions in a a approach does so by from human rights climate and on the have to such on the of that have to these risks. I one such approach on version of is wrong if its the would be by of for the general of that no one could reasonably reject The of is in of The and the to is wrong if can reject principle the for that are to the of in This is also as the not all can for to are must be must be people in generally have for such as and so which not to specific In this and to rights-based can account for the that people generally have that it to on others. the states that would be to reject a principle because it a on principle would on To how the and the in a in which can people a The in this are and a one of the in a of the at has a strong reason principle which would us to while threat of a has a reason principle which would us from the that the of the of a entails that would be principle which would us to to a could be reasonably by because does not for the of it is considered a which in to 2015). this account of can be to cases involving risk. of account which with risk and The between these approaches in the to be to the of for a approaches to the and the states that the is the one that those will in the risk in has the that persons the risk To how approaches a in which have to to billion people to a one in a billion risk of from a with of will state if the first must (as of people to reason to reject a principle that would us to for the first is to the of the second no one is to will a with In the of the of a so will that the first can be reasonably by those are to in the future. to the second of argue that the must be by of a risk of the first has a reason for that is to one of the of This is by the of a and the first the seems to this I the to is a of a risk of this a will a conduct that such risks. This is so since are not by of all that is is to the a problem that is to the emissions that are by climate a are to in some will have to will not to the of by those subject to the climate risks. Even if the that will is principle that climate that are to in can be reasonably will to similarly paralyzing as a rights-based of be to to this a of and its of the PoP is the of this In what follows, I focus on which can the PoP. Climate change is by the emissions of the and the of the of the the disastrous climate change is almost to if the climate change is to the of emissions the would live in to for the would at a would have to of and could a of there is a of not are the face a risk of due to by climate for the of conduct for the and the the are to emissions the are to emissions no one is to emissions principle be reasonably to the is by since are almost to due to the emissions of the the is also by since face a risk of a risk face is that those with the and can reasonably reject the in favor of the the arguably the have to a The of is between and that can the of by by the with which climate change will occur and to and so that the is not to it that the by is by the of by the this is correct, the that can reasonably be in favor of to Caney's human rights can the conclusion that emissions is insofar as not doing so would of those prohibited from and insofar as the of even is to Caney's generally that on luxury emissions to is of to no in on these to a The I here from a of climate Even though I these in the live those are and have to on for a of are also those most at risk due to climate The of the and the will in the that these does not change the as the climate are not it would be in the of to the of the and to a principle that it to subsistence even if such a climate I have problems in the climate ethics The problem of and the so-called In not to from the conclusion of this section, it to that these problems the human rights-based approach of Caney, and not to the that I to here is that the has Caney's one of Caney's human rights approach is that does not to the The PoP because rights-based accounts must some right risk all risk impositions would I in this article that rights face in such a right is and it is In can which risk impositions are in a and The PoP is because us to the of to to climate others' of to risks. the is the it is for to to the climate in if the is the it is for to the climate in on others. no general right climate risk us to in what for risk can and be reasonably this that also the distinction between subsistence and luxury on and the people have for to specific if people generally have good reason to to to on us to at which to it is for people to can a to the at in the between subsistence and luxury is to in the that is is of the the and some reasonably of the with which will with climate can that the will be those that Caney of and so also have reasonably about the with which these will approaches to climate ethics, be of that the with which climate and will is and it as no as I of are also to Caney's rights-based the approach no to its Caney's approach these theoretical of Caney's I that non-consequentialists have good reason to a approach to climate ethics that is well to with the PoP and risk impositions In this article, I that Caney's human rights-based approach to climate ethics is subject to the which rights-based approaches to risk I Caney's distinction between subsistence and luxury emissions a to the PoP and that there are problems with the the right to subsistence on which the is the distinction is and that some will on others' human rights by emissions which climate risks. I that this entails that in some these emissions be on Caney's account and the of emissions are to to what is to a of it is not even what of emissions as I that these with emissions can also not be in a by appealing to I by approach from which the PoP a it is that my here nothing about the of that be in it seems that it is well the of rights climate change as a for the of for disastrous climate as I to have in this article, the of ethical climate favor alternatives to rights-based approaches. The no of