Attack Buffer and Error Elimination Control for Microgrid FDI Attacks

ABSTRACT Secondary distributed control in microgrids is susceptible to false data injection attacks (FDIAs), which attackers can leverage to manipulate the original transmitting frequencies. These manipulations can cause the frequencies to deviate from their expected range or be assigned excessively large data, potentially bringing the system to a halt. In order to tackle this issue, this paper proposes a novel attack buffer method that first significantly reduces the impact of stronger interference. It also efficiently handles limited smaller injections within a generalized scope, enabling the system to function within a controllable range. Furthermore, a straightforward error elimination control loop is designed to manage the persistent deviation caused by the lessened FDIA. The proposed method eliminates the need for observer design and complex control parameter tuning. The proposed method can resist unlimited ramp FDIA. Additionally, it exhibits rapid convergence and smaller transient offsets during load changes. In the event of a transmission fault, the system's stability and performance are maintained. This paper also considers multiple FDIA scenarios to thoroughly validate the practicality of the proposed method. The voltage waveforms and quality analysis are also presented to verify the effectiveness of the proposed method. Finally, its effectiveness is further verified through simulation and FPGA‐in‐the‐loop testing.