Kant's Metaphysics of Race, Its Distinctiveness, and Its Normativity

ABSTRACT Drawing on the contemporary taxonomy of the metaphysics of race, this paper shows that Kant's theory of race occupies a distinct metaphysical position on race. Second, it argues that Kant's metaphysics of race inherently produces racist claims. Contrasting Kant's race theory with other metaphysical positions on race allows us to both understand his theory and its racist aspects better, and to improve the map of metaphysical positions on race. Closer analysis of Kant's metaphysics of race reveals that, contrary to common belief, it is not race essentialism (traditional racialism), it is inaccurate to see it just as a variant of race naturalism, and both racial development and racial hierarchy in Kant's theory are more complex than they seem on most scholars' reading of him. Kant's metaphysics of race, which will be called race teleo‐rationalism , shows that racism could be justified by “reason” and its a priori principles and assumptions.