Evolutionary Game Analysis on the Promotion of Green Buildings in China Under the “Dual Carbon” Goals: A Multi-Stakeholder Perspective

The promotion of green buildings offers an effective solution to climate change and resource scarcity. This study employs game theory to study the evolutionary decision-making processes and stable strategies among three principal stakeholders in the green building sector: the government, construction enterprises, and consumers. By analyzing the primary factors that shape these stakeholders’ strategies, we propose a tripartite evolutionary game model. We utilize MATLAB R2016a to simulate the evolutionary decision-making processes and stable strategies of the three stakeholders, verifying the effectiveness of our approach. Our findings indicate that the government, in its regulatory capacity, plays a critical role in influencing the green building market. Government subsidies and penalties significantly affect the decision-making behavior of enterprises and consumers; in addition, dynamic rewards and punishments can effectively restrain the fluctuation of the game process. The development of the green building market correlates with increased consumer willingness and capacity to purchase green buildings, coupled with significantly reduced construction costs. Throughout this progression, the government gradually withdraws its incentives and shifts toward a more relaxed regulatory stance. Our research also indicates that the cooperative behavior and evolution of the three stakeholders are heavily influenced by key parameters, regardless of their initial states.