Exploring and Modeling the Incentive Strategies of New Energy Ship Application in Yangtze River

The application of new energy ships (NESs) in the Yangtze River is one of the important ways to promote the low-carbon development of Yangtze River shipping, but at present, the enthusiasm of shipping enterprises for it is not high enough. To improve the current situation, the impact of incentive strategies on the NES application is a problem worth studying. We aim to explore an incentive model based on the dynamic evolutionary relationship between the NES application of shipping enterprises and the government’s incentive decision. Theoretical derivations show that there are three possible equilibria in the evolutionary game system and ten major factors that affect the income of the government and shipping enterprises, respectively. Four factors—costs, utility loss, rewards, and tax incentives—are selected for the numerical study: regardless of whether the government takes measures or not, reducing the cost of new energy ship applications can greatly improve the enthusiasm of shipping enterprises; increasing the incentives cannot significantly improve the enthusiasm of shipping enterprises. This paper provides policy recommendations for the application of NES in the Yangtze River, which will help the government to introduce appropriate government incentives.