Issues in Grounded Cognition and How to Solve Them – the Minimalist Account

The field of grounded cognition is concerned with how concepts are represented by re-activation of the bodily modalities. Considerable empirical work supports this core tenet, but the field is rife with meta-theoretical issues which prevent meaningfully progressing beyond this. We describe these issues and provide a solution: an overarching theoretical framework. The two most commonly cited grounded cognition theories are <i>perceptual symbol systems</i> and <i>conceptual metaphor theory</i>. Under perceptual symbol systems, concepts are represented by integrating fragments of multi-modal percepts in a simulator. Conceptual metaphor theory involves a limited number of image schemas, primitive structural regularities extracted from interaction with the environment, undergoing a limited number of transformations into a concept. Both theories constitute important developments to understanding mental representations, yet we argue that they currently impede progress because they are prematurely elaborate. This forces them to rely on overly specific assumptions, which generates a lack of conceptual clarity and unsystematic testing of empirical work. Our <i>minimalist account</i> takes grounded cognition 'back to basics' with a common-denominator framework supported by converging evidence from other fields. It postulates that concepts are represented by simulation, re-activating mental states that were active when experiencing this concept, and by metaphoric mapping, when concrete representations are sourced to represent abstract concepts. This enables incremental theory development without uncertain assumptions because it allows for descriptive research while nonetheless enabling falsification of theories. Our proposal provides the tools to resolve meta-theoretical issues and encourages a research program that integrates grounded cognition into the cognitive sciences.