Shapley Value and USMCA

We model the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) as a cooperative trade game with three national players where Shapley value leads to fair distribution of total trade gains. Based on 2023 figures from International Trade Centre and World Bank, this fair-trade distribution entails annual side payments among the three trading nations, with a total of $118.6 billion accruing to the US based on its large domestic market and greater negotiating power, while retaining the transactional benefits of free trade, unlike actual tariffs. These side payments can be viewed as a form of international Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) to disadvantaged US citizens and firms via their government. We model USMCA as both a trilateral game and as three separate bilateral games. In terms of total side payments, the results are the same. We conclude that Shapley fair-trade calculations should be an integral part of the upcoming USMCA renewal negotiations.

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Publication Details

Journal
Theoretical Economics Letters
Published
2025-01-01
DOI
https://doi.org/10.4236/tel.2025.152025
Primary Topic
Game Theory and Applications
Type
article
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article

Shapley Value and USMCA

Robert A. Agnew
Theoretical Economics Letters
Game Theory and Applications
article

Shapley Value and USMCA

Robert A. Agnew
article en

Abstract

We model the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) as a cooperative trade game with three national players where Shapley value leads to fair distribution of total trade gains. Based on 2023 figures from International Trade Centre and World Bank, this fair-trade distribution entails annual side payments among the three trading nations, with a total of $118.6 billion accruing to the US based on its large domestic market and greater negotiating power, while retaining the transactional benefits of free trade, unlike actual tariffs. These side payments can be viewed as a form of international Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) to disadvantaged US citizens and firms via their government. We model USMCA as both a trilateral game and as three separate bilateral games. In terms of total side payments, the results are the same. We conclude that Shapley fair-trade calculations should be an integral part of the upcoming USMCA renewal negotiations.

Theoretical Economics LettersVol. 15(02)
Palm Research Center (ID)
Openalex Percentile: Top 91%
Game Theory and Applications
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Shapley Value and USMCA — Robert A. Agnew · Theoretical Economics Letters (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS