Luck framing supports the avoidance of collective disaster when inequalities in vulnerability exist

Collective action problems describe situations such as climate change in which the efforts of multiple individuals are required to achieve joint outcomes. Many of these problems feature a threshold (e.g. limiting global warming to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels) that must be achieved in order to avoid a collective disaster (e.g. catastrophic climate change) that may affect individuals to varying degrees. Here we adapt a collective action game called the collective-risk social dilemma in which players in small groups make successive financial contributions towards a group target in order to avoid disaster. We investigate the extent to which different levels (resilient vs. vulnerable) and sources (luck vs. merit) of vulnerability to the disaster influence efforts to avoid it. We find that luck framing supports the avoidance of disaster: 76 % of groups with luck-based inequalities successfully achieve the group target compared with 40 % of groups with merit-based inequalities. This difference is driven by higher contributions towards the target from players whose level of vulnerability is determined by luck rather than merit. We also find that despite having different levels of vulnerability to the disaster, resilient and vulnerable players contribute similarly towards the group target. Our findings highlight the potential importance of luck framing in collective action problems that involve individuals with different levels of vulnerability to a collective risk. We discuss implications for policymakers and groups seeking to solve such problems. • We study inequalities in vulnerability to a collective disaster in a climate change game. • Luck (vs. merit) framing supports the avoidance of collective disaster. • Participants with luck-based vulnerability contribute more to the avoidance of disaster.