Logical fallacies in democratic theory or how dialectical logic may help

The paper presents a critique of the logical foundations in mainstream democratic theory, with a particular focus on the so-called Logic of Identity, as originally articulated by G.W.F. Hegel in Western philosophical discourse. Firstly, the paper presents a reconstruction of the logical shortcomings and proposes a pragmatic and materialist use of dialectical logic inspired by Henri Lefèbvre as a solution to this problem in general. While the Logic of Identity has yielded valuable insights, it is static and historically rooted in a given status quo incapable of understanding contradictions. In contrast, dialectical logic provides a dynamic and synthesising tool and method capable of incorporating contradictions as explanatory factors. Secondly, the paper elaborates on the critique by discussing different approaches to the concept of democracy which attempt to address the outlined problems within the Logic of Identity. In particular, it addresses the ladder of abstraction proposed by Collier and Levitsky and democracy as an essentially contested concept, since both are dominant strategies. It is argued that they are still insufficient to overcome the problems of the Logic of Identity. Finally, it is demonstrated that current contributions still operate within the boundaries of the Logic of Identity. The conclusion synthesises the insights to present a preliminary dialectical conceptualisation of democracy.