In opposition to alethic views of moral responsibility

Abstract A standard analysis of moral responsibility states that an agent A is morally responsible for φ‐ing if and only if it is fitting to have—depending on the nature of φ—a negative or positive reactive emotion vis‐à‐vis A on account of A's φ‐ing. Proponents of Alethic views of moral responsibility maintain that the relevant notion of fittingness in the analysis should be understood in terms of accurate representation. The allure of understanding emotional fittingness as representational accuracy arguably stems from the widespread idea that emotions are representational mental states with a mind‐to‐world direction of fit. Accordingly, defenders of Alethic views argue that the fittingness of a potential reactive emotion is a matter of whether the representational content of that emotion accurately matches the targeted agent. The aim of this article is to argue against Alethic views of moral responsibility by means of exposing various problems that these accounts face in virtue of their inherent commitment to understand emotional fittingness in terms of representational accuracy.