The Game Relationship of Metro Station Connection Mode: The Competition and Complementarity of Bike-Sharing and Bus

Previous studies have revealed that the relationship between bike-sharing and the bus system in connecting metro stations is substitution and supplement. However, the choice integration mode of users between bike-sharing and bus for the last-mile connection to the urban metro has not been sufficiently studied. This paper aims to address this gap and explore to promote stable connection integration while easing the financial pressure of governments. To achieve this, we employed evolutionary game theory to examine the complex behavior interaction between governments and operations, taking into account subsidy policy phase-outs. This paper defined the ideal event and analyzed the impact of critical factors on the dynamic evolution process, and gained valuable insights. Subsequently, we validated the game models and primary conclusions using actual traffic data. Additionally, we conducted a sensitivity analysis of factors based on the dynamics simulation model. The results demonstrate that the adjustment of factors can promote the integration model optimization on subsidy phasing-out. The integration decision of factors with real data provides a valuable reference for governments and operations. The findings hold significant meaning in promoting connection integration and enhancing the overall attractiveness of metro transportation.