The Kantian Version of Russellian Neutral Monism

Abstract Kant pioneered in the 18th century what Russell called “neutral monism”, which encompasses four key doctrines: (i) structuralism concerning matter, where physical properties are viewed as relational; (ii) realism regarding quiddities as intrinsic properties; (iii) inscrutability concerning quiddities; and (iv) the notion that quiddities constitute phenomenal consciousness. This association with modern Newtonian physics is not coincidental, as it demonstrates the fundamental characteristics of Kantian neutral monism. Two noteworthy aspects define Kant’s neutral monism: firstly, the premise that psychological representation arises from noumena as irreducible facts that defy explanation, and secondly, the assumption that phenomenal consciousness emanates from the apprehension of a perception that appears as a conceptually indeterminate object. Consequently, such consciousness proves suitable for cognitive processes, reasoning, and the rational control of actions. It can be argued that Kant’s formulation of neutral monism incorporates the virtues found in contemporary variants while avoiding their associated drawbacks.