Slurs, Truth Conditions and Semantic Internalism

Abstract One class of views identifies the derogatory capacity of a slur with its truth-conditional contribution, while a second class denies this. This second class of pragmatic views is purportedly burdened with the non-pejorative counterpart problem. Pragmatic approaches to slur derogation mandate that each slur has an alternative coextensive non-derogatory expression—a non-pejorative counterpart. We offer a solution to this problem that identifies its source with the underlying assumption that expressions have extensions, an assumption largely independent of any commitments central to pragmatic approaches to slur derogation. If meanings are instructions to build concepts, then neither slurs nor their purported counterparts have extensions, and thereby cannot be coextensive. By treating meanings as instructions, not only can pragmatic views avoid the problem counterparts pose, but such a semantics offers a flexibility that can accommodate multiple pragmatic mechanisms to explain the complex behavior of slurs and their use.