International Criminal Tribunals as Triggers of Institutional Change? Evidence from Ad Hoc Tribunals and the icc’s Referral and Proprio Motu Cases

Abstract The current article examines whether international criminal tribunals ( ict ) can be regarded as actors of international relations, which trigger domestic policy changes in countries under their jurisdiction. Drawing on the concepts of ‘third party enforcement’ and ‘credible commitment’ theory, the study examines ict cases during which an ict carried out investigations and prosecutions against the will of the respective sitting government. Based on field research from seven states and three tribunals, the authors present some counterintuitive conclusions. Limited institutional reforms did take place; they can at least partly be attributed to ict decisions and they proved more sustainable in autocratic states than in some democratic ones. Independence from the organizations and states which created the tribunals does not always help tribunals to carry out their mission; it rather strengthens their actorness and influence if they enjoy their founders’ strong support but keep distance to the countries in which they investigate.