Exploring the relationship between governance mechanisms and contractor behaviors: insights from fairness perception

The principal-agent problem arising from the inconsistency of interests and information asymmetry between owner and contractors in construction projects inevitably leads to conflicts among project stakeholders. A reasonable governance mechanism can effectively reduce the alleviate competitive game between owner and contractors, and lower the risk of opportunistic behaviors. Therefore, it is a pragmatic choice to improve project performance to discuss how to improve the relationship between project owner and contractor from the perspective of governance. However, previous study has lacked in-depth analysis and validation of the intrinsic connection between project governance and contractual behavior, leaving the black box between these two aspects to be explored. Therefore, to bridge these research gaps, this study incorporates the fairness perception into the theoretical model examining the impact of governance mechanisms on contractor behavior, and empirically validates its mediating role in the relationship between governance mechanisms and contractor behavior. This study not only unveils the intrinsic mechanism through which project governance influences contractor behavior from the perspective of fairness perception, but also aids in curbing opportunistic behaviors exhibited by contractors while increasing the likelihood of positive contractual performance. Consequently, it provides effective theoretical guidance for researchers and practitioners for project management.