Untangling the Gordian knot of motive

The centrality of intention for criminal law is virtually undisputed. The role of motive is equally solidified, though for the converse reason: while intention is seen as the hallmark of criminal responsibility, motive is commonly held to be irrelevant. The aim of my paper is to question this received wisdom. Contrary to the existing literature, however, I do not premise my critique on normative considerations. Instead, I advance an argument in favour of motive’s relevance to criminal liability that is grounded in an action-theoretic appraisal of the very nature of motive itself. Over the course of the paper, I situate their role and function in criminal law, before proposing a novel account of how we are to best understand what motives are. My account – according to which motives are ‘focal desires’ – is not only able to unify the many guises motives take in the law but also illustrates why they are, at least sometimes, relevant to criminal liability.