Judicial and legislative responses to unequal bargaining power in standard form contracts: A comparative study

The imbalance of bargaining power in standard form contracts often leads to inequitable agreements that mostly benefit dominant entities, including major enterprises, service providers, and financial institutions. These contracts, sometimes offered on a

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Publication Details

Journal
International Journal of Law Justice and Jurisprudence
Published
2025-01-01
DOI
https://doi.org/10.22271/2790-0673.2025.v5.i1c.183
Primary Topic
Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Judicial and legislative responses to unequal bargaining power in standard form contracts: A comparative study

Ravi Yadav, Nirmit Jadwani
International Journal of Law Justice and Jurisprudence
Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
article

Judicial and legislative responses to unequal bargaining power in standard form contracts: A comparative study

Ravi Yadav, Nirmit Jadwani
article en

Abstract

The imbalance of bargaining power in standard form contracts often leads to inequitable agreements that mostly benefit dominant entities, including major enterprises, service providers, and financial institutions. These contracts, sometimes offered on a

International Journal of Law Justice and JurisprudenceVol. 5(1)
Christ University (IN), Savitribai Phule Pune University (IN)
Reduced inequalities
Openalex Percentile: Top 89%
Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
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