Rațiune și pasiune în etica lui Hume
Morality is a philosophical area in which David Hume developed a distinctive but controversial vision. Unlike the traditional ethical paradigm, which postulates the hegemony of reason in the production of the moral act, the Humean view gives preeminence to feelings and passions in determining moral distinctions. Therefore, moral conflict occurs only between different or contrary passions, not between passions and reason, since reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions. But this famous Humean expression does not exclude the involvement of reason in ethics, nor does it grant reason only a subordinate role in its relation to the passions. This study supports the hypothesis that reason is indispensable in Humean ethics and that the relation between reason and passions is mainly one of collaboration, not opposition. Moreover, according to Hume, the difference between man and animals regarding the sense of morality is made rather by reason, which is the privilege of man alone, than by feelings and passions, which are also common to animals.
Publication Details
- Journal
- Revista de filosofie.
- Published
- 2024-10-01
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.59277/rf.2024.71.5.06
- Primary Topic
- Educational Challenges and Innovations
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00