A Matter of Standing: Praise and Blame with Respect To Health

Abstract Using experimental philosophy methodologies, this paper explores standing to blame and praise, specifically within respect to health and health advice. Our primary aim is to contribute insights to the literature on standing, while also addressing work in medical ethics on the appropriate roles of doctors. Two main principles regarding standing emerge from these areas: the Differential Relationship Principle and the Hypocrisy Principle. To propel the debates and test these principles, we investigate whether standing judgments are affected by factors such as relationship (whether the person giving health advice is a friend or a doctor), advisor consistency (whether the advisor themselves follow the health advice they offer), and advisee consistency (whether the advice-recipient follows the advice). Moreover, we explore how participants perceive the degree of blame or praise individuals deserve for following health advice or for their health outcome. Our main findings indicate that, surprisingly, doctors are judged to have a higher standing compared to friends, and that hypocritical behavior does not significantly reduce the perceived standing of either doctors or friends. We conclude by discussing the significance of our findings and outlining potential directions for future research.