Is Kafka inevitable? Political institutions and the structure of communication protocols

Abstract Communication protocols define modes of communication and channels of information flow within an organization. We model communication protocols as a formal signaling game. In our theory, the expected biases in decision-making can cause economic losses due to information manipulation, creating a need for communication protocols which control access to information and technologies that manage this access. The challenge is that these solutions often lead to Kafkaesque institutions—complex and confusing protocols which dampen organizational responsiveness to environmental shifts. This is especially significant in government where performance-based, pecuniary incentive schemes are less feasible or expressly prohibited. We present a case study of open-government initiatives that illustrates the theory, including that such initiatives are more likely to be adopted at lower levels of government, and offer an information-management rationale for federated governance systems (JEL B52, D02, D23, D82, H11).