Early Chinese Madhyamaka Ethics: Revisiting the Subtleties of Jizang’s Claim That “Grasses and Trees Possess Buddha-Nature”

Taking Jiaxiang Jizang’s (嘉祥吉藏, 549–623) statement that “grasses and trees possess Buddha-nature” (草木有佛性, cao mu you foxing) as an example of Early Chinese Madhyamaka ethics, I provide an analysis of the two main propositions of his claim and discuss the ethical significance thereof to highlight the characteristics of Early Chinese Madhyamaka ethics. Although the two propositions appear contradictory in a literal sense, differing criteria are employed in each to establish whether or not grasses and trees and sentient beings possess Buddha-nature—namely, dependent origination and emptiness in the first and non-attainment in the second. I also point out that the ethical significance of the first proposition exhibits a shift from ontology to moral awareness and then to moral disposition as the practitioner in moral accomplishment, while the approach of the second proposition is instead an ontological inquiry into the origins of morality, with an ethical outlook founded on the soteriological aspect of self-discipline. I conclude by showing that no single theory of Western ethics can be suitably applied to the Chinese Madhyamaka ethics of Jizang, as any such attempt would prove incompatible with his philosophical standpoint of non-attainment.