Collaboration and participation in governance

We are living in turbulent times. Rising conflicts disrupt the global order. Elections reflect the increasing tendencies of politicization and polarization of public debates. Past and future crises, such as those regarding climate change and public health, demand action by policy makers and citizens. Different governance levels, disciplinary knowledge, and relations between politics, society, industry, and science spark discussions and challenges as to how to tackle the pre-eminent problems of today. The articles published in this RPR issue address different aspects of these topics and present recent research on collaboration and participation in governing today's societies worldwide. An ongoing question of policy making is the extent to which scientific knowledge should have an influence on decision-making. Under the term of evidence-based or evidence-informed policy making (Head, 2024) as well as within the strand of research on policy advisory systems (Craft & Wilder, 2017; Migone & Howlett, 2025), scholars study the relations between scientists and policy makers in different institutional structures and facing different societal challenges. One important aspect of translating science into policy is the aspect of policy learning (Easton et al., 2024; Zaki, 2024) but which actors learn and how learning processes take place are still underresearched. Rittelmeyer et al. (2025) study the processes of learning in polycentric governance systems and argue that actors with executive responsibilities learn and participate differently than specialized staff. Using a mixed-methods design, they find that specialized staff is more likely to participate in forums and thereby to become part of epistemic communities that promote collective learning, while executive staff possesses power but not necessarily knowledge. The authors propose strategies to overcome this disjunction in polycentric governance, such as institutional forums and arrangements linking science to policy. The second article by Reyes-Gonzalez et al. (2025) connects to this question of information exchange in governance networks and seeks to identify drivers of such exchange. Testing three competing explanations—those of shared participatory motivations, co-participation in institutional committees, and perceived influence—they analyze 10 different multistakeholder partnerships in their efforts to implement anti-corruption mechanisms in Latin America, Africa, and Eurasia. After disseminating an online survey, the authors transformed the responses into information exchange networks to test the influence of the hypothesized factors for information exchange. They found that perceived influence was a major driver of information exchange, alongside co-participation in institutional committees, while shared beliefs or motivational similarity played a minor role. These findings connect to existing research on the question of cooperation based on shared beliefs as assumed by the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (Henry, 2011; Karimo et al., 2023; Koebele & Crow, 2023; Weible & Sabatier, 2009) and the role of perceived influence of policy actors and their co-participation in forums (Herzog et al., 2021; Ingold & Fischer, 2014; Möck, 2021). One place where collaboration is both necessary and eminent is the European Union. It is therefore also worth studying under which conditions the EU has adopted a highly contested policy and innovative international climate policy instrument: the Carbone Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). The EU has substantial competencies in environmental policy and yet frequently faces opposition from within or outside its members (Bazzan et al., 2022; Tosun & Peters, 2018). Wettestad (2025) explains the adoption of the CBAM with a perspective on shifting Multilevel Reinforcement (MLR). This analytical framework sees both the actions and commitments of pioneering states and the leadership assumed by central EU institutions—the Parliament and the Commission—as drivers of EU policies. Tracing the process of the adoption of this policy instrument, the author outlines how France first initiated the idea, how the 2015 Paris Agreement and growing Parliament activism further supported French campaigning, how the European Green Deal included the CBAM as a central element, and how finally the decision-making process unraveled from 2021 onward. The article outlines how a shift in leadership of central EU institutions and EU member states can explain policy output. The challenges and opportunities of multilevel governance do not only exist at the EU level but are also observable at national levels, where coordination can be studied further. García-Juanatey et al. (2025) address the empirical puzzle which consists of Spain having established a multilevel structure for governing higher education quality assurance, which is usually concentrated at a national level via a single agency or competition between accreditation bodies. The Spanish case therefore stands out and allows for drawing conclusions for interagency coordination over time. Employing a longitudinal case study design and in-depth interviews with experts and actors involved in the evolution of the quality assurance system, the authors find that the path-dependence of interactions over time, in combination with the administrative culture and the mode of coordination, essentially structures the relations between agencies and the long-term evolvement of multilevel structures. Thereby, the authors contribute to the study of multilevel governance in Spain and more generally (Bache et al., 2016; Navarro & Velasco, 2022), as well as the governance of higher education policy in particular (Capano & Lepori, 2024; Capano & Pritoni, 2020). Since the introduction of New Public Governance, metrics for measuring the quality and efficiency of public administration services have played a central role. In this context, benchmarking has gained great significance (Ammons, 2001; Papaioannou et al., 2006; Zohlnhöfer & Herweg, 2025). Benchmarking not only needs parameters and measurement methods, it also needs comparative figures. In view of the heterogeneity of administrations, it is an important political decision as to what is compared with whom. Cao and Yi (2025) investigate the emergence of benchmarking networks, which are necessary to identify best practice. The study employs an exponential random graph model (ERGM) to analyze the formation of interstate benchmarking networks using data from the American State Administrators Project (ASAP) conducted in 1998. The findings reveal that both mutuality and transitivity significantly influence these networks, highlighting the importance of existing relationships and comparative behaviors among state agencies. These results not only contribute to the theoretical understanding of public sector benchmarking by integrating social comparison theory but also provide practical insights for policy makers seeking to enhance interagency cooperation. By identifying crucial factors that facilitate effective benchmarking, the study offers valuable guidance for improving public administration performance through strategic networking. In recent decades, environmental justice councils (EJCs) have been introduced as a special form of collaborative governance in the United States. In other countries, there exist similar approaches, although sometimes with different names and forms (Martinez-Alier et al., 2016). EJCs typically consist of government representatives, community members, and key organizations, including environmental and social justice nonprofits and business groups. Their primary role is to advise on policies that ensure communities of color, and low-income populations do not face disproportionate environmental harms and have equitable access to environmental benefits. Ambrose et al. (2025) examine conflict dynamics within a specific state-level EJC from public policy perspectives informed by collaborative governance (Lahat et al., 2023; Ulibarri et al., 2020) and the Policy Conflict Framework (Weible & Heikkila, 2017; Yi et al., 2022). These frameworks illustrate how diverse stakeholder coalitions influence policy discussions, emphasizing that conflict among policy actors can be both expected and constructive, facilitating the expression of varying viewpoints and enabling negotiations toward consensus. The methodology involves a two-part Poisson mixed-effects hurdle model to analyze conflict statements recorded in meeting minutes, illuminating the relationships between participant roles, sectoral backgrounds, and the nature of interactions during discussions. The results indicate that appointed citizens exhibit a higher level of conflict in their communications compared to government actors, particularly when engaging frequently with authority figures, highlighting the complex dynamics of stakeholder interactions within the EJC. Another important tool for bringing societal interests into political processes is performance ranking, as it encourages public organizations to enhance their performance and become more accountable to citizens (Rainey et al., 2021). This system evaluates and ranks organizations based on measurable outcomes, contributing to accountability and resource allocation. In China, performance ranking plays a central role in governance as it aims to increase the efficiency of locally managed authorities and foster public trust, which contrasts sharply with the often election-based and participatory approaches found in Western democracies, where citizen feedback and elections are crucial for accountability (Li, 2015). Zhang, Zhai, et al. (2025) examine how the ranking positions of grassroots governments in Beijing affect their responsiveness to public complaints, and how this relationship is influenced by the number of peer governments supervised by the same higher authority, referred to as the span of control. The study utilizes an original monthly panel dataset, which includes responsiveness information for 333 grassroots governments from February 2019 to December 2020. The key findings indicate that a high/low ranking is associated with a decrease/increase in government responsiveness in the subsequent period, and this effect weakens as the span of control increases. These results are significant for policy process research as they illustrate how performance ranking systems can influence the strategic decisions of government authorities, particularly in nondemocratic contexts. They also provide practical insights for developing effective performance management approaches that could enhance the actual responsiveness of government entities. The challenges related to effective public participation in environmental decision-making processes are compounded by traditional methods that often exclude diverse community voices and fail to address local needs. A compelling example of this issue is found in the Appalachian region of the United States, where the legacy of abandoned coal mining sites presents significant environmental hazards. This area spans seven U.S. states and is home to 5.5 million people who are exposed to health and safety risks. The unique socioeconomic dynamics and reliance on coal mining in this region highlight the urgent need for improved public engagement in reclamation processes that directly impact local communities. Kendrick and Kim (2025) investigate the barriers to effective public participation in Appalachian's Abandoned Mine Land (AML) program. The study uses a mixed-methods approach, analyzing state and tribal Annual Evaluation Reports from 2015 to 2019 to identify public engagement practices, while also surveying community organizations involved in the AML. The findings reveal that states and tribes predominantly relied on traditional public engagement methods, such as meetings and hearings, and identified key barriers to effective participation, including a lack of information about engagement opportunities and unclear project selection processes. The study suggests that agencies should enhance transparency by making decision-making information more accessible on their websites, expand outreach efforts using multiple media platforms such as newsletters and social media, and strengthen partnerships with community organizations to foster greater participation. The discussion proposes various instruments to improve transparency and participation. Digital instruments play a central role here. In addition to simple mail distribution lists, electronic platforms, which have already been evaluated in other contexts (Schröder & Bandelow, 2024), could also be used. However, purely digital participation will not be enough. The study confirms other findings that show that participation must aim for higher levels on the participation ladder (Arnstein, 1969), fully involve those affected, and, above all, build trust (Dvir et al., 2024; Kim & Lee, 2012). Governance does not only regard participation and cooperation between the government and citizens or nongovernmental organizations but also highlight the necessity for collaboration within the government. This includes, inter alia, horizontal collaboration between governmental departments which has long been considered crucial in public administration and policy process studies (Peters, 1998; for more recent studies see, e.g., Esposito et al., 2024; Kuitert et al., 2023; Park et al., 2021). Zhang, Luo, et al. (2025) contribute to this research with a study on interdepartmental cooperation and its influence on effective policy mixes by investigating the case of domestic waste management in China. In line with previous research (Capano & Howlett, 2020; Edmondson et al., 2019; Mavrot et al., 2019), the authors argue that successfully addressing complex sustainability challenges requires a combination of diverse policy instruments. This is, however, especially challenging in political environments with high fragmentation and compartmentalization of government as has been shown previously in China's waste management (Ma et al., 2020). Based on data from over 3400 policy documents from 32 cities in China (2012–2021), Zhang and colleagues used Social Network Analysis and regressions to empirically investigate the relationship between interdepartmental cooperation and effective policy mixes. The results reveal a trend toward more cooperative networks in China's waste management driven by performance pressures from the central government. This increased collaboration has led to the adoption of more innovative and integrated policy mixes, subsequently improving policy coherence and effectiveness. Moreover, the findings suggest that interdepartmental cooperation not only influences policy design but also enhances outcomes by promoting complementarity across policy tools. Zooming in on the municipal level of policy making, Xing and Yang (2025) contribute to this RPR issue with another Social Network Analysis to shed light on the relationship between individuals' career mobility and interlocal cooperation. The authors build on the Institutional Collective Action Framework (ICA, Feiock, 2013; Kim et al., 2022) and emphasize the understudied role of individual decision-makers therein. Using the empirical example of watershed environmental collaboration in China from 2007 to 2019, the authors analyze how decision-makers' interjurisdictional transfer networks impact future collaboration. The findings demonstrate that local decision-makers who move between jurisdictions create social networks that significantly enhance the likelihood of collaborative action across local governments. This effect was shown to be even stronger when successiveness, diagonal promotions, and collegiality are present. These findings echo theoretical approaches that emphasize the importance of policy actors' biographic intersections and shared social identities as a basis for collaboration and policy preferences (Bandelow et al., 2024; Bandelow & Hornung, 2023; Capano et al., 2024; Hornung & Bandelow, 2025). The next paper by Qin and Zhao (2025) contributes to the study of collaboration in governance by taking a closer look at the counterintuitively declining involvement of private enterprises in China's public–private partnerships (PPPs). Despite governmental promotion of PPP, partnerships in China have been criticized for an overly high share of state-owned enterprises and rather “Quasi-public–private partnerships” (Lu et al., 2021). The authors address this research puzzle by applying transaction cost theory and a four-pillar framework encompassing government, market, transactional, and project-related factors to study criteria that can explain private (non)participation in over 10,000 PPP projects in China from 2014 to 2019. The analysis posits project-related criteria (e.g., duration and investment levels) as the main explanatory factor for low levels of private participation, while transaction costs play a less important role. Besides this, private sector organizations in close proximity to national power centers were shown to be increasingly involved in PPP. Adding to previous studies on the governing infrastructure and success factors of PPP (Deinde-Adedeji et al., 2024; Hodge et al., 2017; Rosser et al., 2024), Qin and Zhao conclude that the promotion of private participation is not resolved by one singular policy but relies on a coherent multifaceted approach that addresses investor concerns. The closing paper of this RPR issue by Sarturi et al. (2025) presents a bibliometric analysis of over four decades of publications on the use of stakeholder theory in public sector management. theory and its on and a relationship with actors have been used in private sector management et al., that such strategies can also be for public sector Sarturi and colleagues present the results of their analysis of articles published between and the evolution of stakeholder theory in public sector over time, and seven of which arrangements for stakeholder and organizations, and are particularly public administration does with key of stakeholder theory collaborative governance (e.g., & stakeholder participation (e.g., et al., and performance (e.g., et al., the analysis that still in the this, the authors propose a research on stakeholder interactions with public and Bandelow, Hornung, & Wilder, 2017; Migone & Howlett, et al., 2024; Zaki, (Henry, 2011; Karimo et al., 2023; Koebele & Crow, 2023; Weible & Sabatier, et al., 2021; Ingold & Fischer, 2014; Möck, et al., 2022; Tosun & Peters, et al., 2016; Navarro & Velasco, & Lepori, 2024; Capano and Pritoni, 2001; Papaioannou et al., 2006; Zohlnhöfer & Herweg, et al., et al., 2023; Ulibarri et al., & Heikkila, 2017; Yi et al., et al., & Bandelow, et al., 2024; Kim & Lee, 1998; for more recent studies e.g., Esposito et al., 2024; Kuitert et al., 2023; Park et al., & Howlett, 2020; Edmondson et al., 2019; Mavrot et al., et al., Feiock, 2013; Kim et al., et al., 2024; Bandelow & Hornung, 2023; Capano et al., 2024; Hornung & Bandelow, et al., et al., 2024; Hodge et al., 2017; Rosser et al., et al., & et al., et al., Bandelow, Hornung, a RPR a (Head, 2024), (Craft Wilder, 2017; Migone Howlett, 2025), a (Easton et al., 2024; Zaki, 2024), a Rittelmeyer et al. 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