The Insanity Defense: A Philosophical Analysis

The Insanity Defense: A Philosophical Analysis is a brief but rich analysis of the insanity defense through a personalist philosophical view of human nature. 1 This is a viewpoint that emphasizes humans as rational and endowed with free will.In analyzing the insanity defense, Wojciech Zauski weaves together a philosophicalanthropological approach to understanding free will with evaluations of scientific understandings of human nature, including criminology, cognitive psychology, and evolutionary theory. 2 The author cogently argues that the insanity defense cannot be appropriately examined without analyzing complex questions of human agency and free will.Zauski lays out the purpose and basic philosophical underpinnings of the book in the Introduction and acquaints the reader with the concepts driving the analysis in subsequent chapters.Prominently, the author introduces four models of criminal responsibility based on two components: (1) the mental state of the individual and (2) how the individual's mental state impacts their criminal responsibility.The first model is the Standard Model, which assumes the mentally sane can be held criminally responsible for their actions, and the mentally insane cannot be held responsible.Second is the Perverse Model, in which the mentally sane are not held responsible, and the mentally insane are held responsible for their actions.The third model is the Negative Equalization Model, where both the mentally sane and the mentally insane are not held responsible, and the fourth is the Positive Equalization Model, in which the mentally sane and the mentally insane are both held responsible for their actions.The Standard Model is identified as the dominant model.Chapter 1 looks closely at the philosophical foundations supporting recognition of the insanity defense.The author focuses on analyzing and critiquing various conceptions of criminal responsibility and discussing two accounts of mental illness: (1) the Affirmative Account and (2) the Negationist Account, which is connected to the anti-psychiatry movement.Zauski's examination of the Negationist Account of mental illness is particularly strong and provides the reader with insights into the interconnections among criminal justice, psychiatry, psychology, and philosophy, especially how historical developments in one area impact the other areas.For example, the author summarizes the history of the "deinstitutionalization of mental illness" in the US in the 20th century and how deinstitutionalization shifted the mentally ill from mental hospitals into the criminal justice system and prisons (p.56).In examining the philosophical foundations of the insanity defense in Chapter 1, Zauski provides support for the argument that legal systems should recognize the insanity defense and that free will provides the most accurate conception of human nature to justify retributive punishment.Zauski identifies two primary variants of the insanity defense: (1) the cognitive variant and (2) the cognitivevolitional variant.The cognitive variant assumes individuals are not responsible if the individual did not understand the nature of their act or the act's negative normative quality.The cognitive-volitional variant adds a volitional component, which assumes individuals are not responsible if they could not control their actions.Chapter 2 looks closely at the cognitive component, which requires an individual to have factual knowledge-meaning they understand the nature and quality of their actions-and normative knowledge-meaning the individual knows that their actions are wrong according to legal and/or moral norms.The author begins with a brief overview of the 1 Personalist philosophy emphasizes the person as the central point of inquiry.