Inferring Causation: Risks, ‘Common Experience’ and Social Facts

When determining causation in tort law, courts often infer causal links between a defendant’s negligence and a plaintiff’s injury, even where there is only limited evidence. This article considers the principles that govern the process of drawing inferences and their application in Australian law. Causal inferences are triggered by the defendant’s conduct that significantly increases the risk of precisely the type of harm to the plaintiff that occurred, absent other plausible causal explanations for the plaintiff’s harm. Importantly, however, courts have repeatedly substantiated causal inferences based on the ‘course of common experience’, ‘common sense’, etc. As Kylie Burns demonstrates, it is important to examine judicial statements about how the world operates (‘social facts’), especially when unsupported by evidence. Although reliance on unsupported assumptions may be problematic in some contexts, this article demonstrates that social facts in causation cases usually concern day-to-day matters and do not necessarily reflect social biases.

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Publication Details

Journal
University of New South Wales Law Journal
Published
2025-04-01
DOI
https://doi.org/10.53637/zykt5980
Primary Topic
Legal Education and Practice Innovations
Type
article
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article

Inferring Causation: Risks, ‘Common Experience’ and Social Facts

Joachim Dietrich
University of New South Wales Law Journal
Legal Education and Practice Innovations
article

Inferring Causation: Risks, ‘Common Experience’ and Social Facts

Joachim Dietrich
article en

Abstract

When determining causation in tort law, courts often infer causal links between a defendant’s negligence and a plaintiff’s injury, even where there is only limited evidence. This article considers the principles that govern the process of drawing inferences and their application in Australian law. Causal inferences are triggered by the defendant’s conduct that significantly increases the risk of precisely the type of harm to the plaintiff that occurred, absent other plausible causal explanations for the plaintiff’s harm. Importantly, however, courts have repeatedly substantiated causal inferences based on the ‘course of common experience’, ‘common sense’, etc. As Kylie Burns demonstrates, it is important to examine judicial statements about how the world operates (‘social facts’), especially when unsupported by evidence. Although reliance on unsupported assumptions may be problematic in some contexts, this article demonstrates that social facts in causation cases usually concern day-to-day matters and do not necessarily reflect social biases.

University of New South Wales Law JournalVol. 48(1)
Openalex Percentile: Top 89%
Legal Education and Practice Innovations
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Inferring Causation: Risks, ‘Common Experience’ and Social Facts — Joachim Dietrich · University of New South Wales Law Journal (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS